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DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND BIOETIDCAL CHOICES:
VOTING LIFE AND DEATH AT THE BALLOT BOX
.Judith F. Daar•
Direct democracy, the political process that enables citizens to draft,
circulate, and enact laws, has become the refuge for grassroots
organizations seeking statutory validation in a legislative arena
perceived to be unresponsive or unfriendly to their concerns. One
group ofcitizens, advocates for physician-aid-in-dying, has recently
emerged on the national scene, sponsoring state ballot initiatives
in three states and pledging to continue their quest for legalization
ofphysician-assisted death throughout the country. In this Article,
Professor Daar examines the interplay between direct democracy
and regulation of end-of-life decision making. This examination
reveals that lawmaking by initiative, as seen through the campaigns to gain legalization ofphysician-aid-in-dying, is no less susceptible to the ravages ofpolitical wrangling than is representative
democracy. Professor Daar argues that direct democracy is best
utilized as a spur to legislative action rather than as a replacement
for the study and compromise unique to legislating through representative democracy. In addition, the author advocates recognition
of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in choices surrounding death, thus providing a threshold level of protection to all
citizens, not just those whose lawmakers or citizens are motivated
to codify this fundamental right.

INTRODUCTION

On election day in November 1992, voters across the country
went to the polls to cast their votes on a variety of political
inquiries, ranging from who should serve as the next president
of the United States to whether members of Congress should
be limited in the number of terms they serve. 1 In several

•
Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. A.B. 1981, University of Michigan;
J.D. 1984, Georgetown University Law Center. A draft of this Article was presented
at the annual meeting of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics on October
7, 1994 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Special thanks to Eric Daar for his suggestions
and insights during the drafting stages of this Article. I also want to thank Laura
Schulte and Brian Otis for their diligent and thorough research assistance.
1.
See Robert Reinhold, Move to Limit Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in
14 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at BB; Robin Toner, Clinton Captures Presidency
with Huge Electoral Margin; Wins a Democratic Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992,
at Al.

799

800

Univen;ity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:4

states, ballots also included questions that are more correctly
characterized as social, or perhaps personal, in nature: Should
physicians be permitted to render aid-in-dying to terminally
ill patients?2 Should women be protected from state interference with their right to choose abortion prior to fetal viability?3
Should the state be required to condemn homosexuality as
abnormal and to actively discourage its practice?4
Each of the foregoing arguably apolitical questions was presented to voters in the form of a ballot initiative. 5 An initiative
allows citizens to draft their own proposed laws, circulate petitions to raise a required number of signatures, and then place
the proposed law on the ballot. 6 If the initiative receives a
simple majority vote, the measure becomes law. 7 By empowering citizens to formulate, circulate, and vote on their own
notions of what the law should be, the initiative serves as a

2.
For example, Proposition 161, entitled the "Death with Dignity Act,n posed
this question to voters in California; the proposition was defeated by a vote of 54%
to 46%. Michael Miller, Doctor·Assisted Suicide Measure Loses in California, Reuters,
Nov. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. For a more elaborate
discussion of circumstances surrounding the defeat of Proposition 161, see infra text
accompanying notes 241-46.
3.
Two states' ballots contained questions regarding abortion rights. See
Reinhold, supra note 1, at BS. In Maryland, voters approved Initiative 6, which
prohibits the state from interfering with a woman's decision to abort a pregnancy prior
to fetal viability. Id. In Arizona, voters rejected Initiative 110, which would have
eliminated public funding of abortion except when the mother's life is threatened. Id.
4.
This was one of two questions pertaining to homosexual rights put to voters
in the November 1992 general election. See Reinhold, supra note 1, at BS. Oregon
Initiative 9, defeated by a vote of 57% to 43%, would have amended the state constitution to require that the government discourage homosexuality. Id. In Colorado, voters
approved Amendment 2 by a margin of 53% to 47%. Id. The initiative amended the
Colorado Constitution to bar state and local governments from prohibiting discrimination claims based on sexual orientation. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b; Ned Zeman
et al., No "Special Rights» for Gays, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1992, at 32. On October 11,
1994, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a trial court's entry of a permanent
injunction barring enforcement of Amendment 2, holding that the State had no
compelling interest in amending the constitution to infringe on fundamental federal
rights. Evans v. Romer, SS2 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
1092 (1995).
5.
Reinhold, supra note 1, at BS.
6.
See CALIFORNIA CoMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FoURTH BRANCH OF GoVERNMENT 34 (1992) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY BY INmATIVE]. Generally the initiative allows voters to propose both legislative measures, called
statutory initiatives, and constitutional amendments, called constitutional initiatives;
an initiative begins with the filing of a petition, signed by a certain number of citizens.
THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL 2 (19S9).
7.
See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 173. Most states with initiatives
also allow voters to amend their state constitutions through the initiative process, but
some impose higher voting requirements, such as a super-majority vote. Id.
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form of direct democracy. 8 Direct democracy, in contrast to
representative democracy, 9 allows citizens to vote directly on
whether they want a particular proposal to become law. By
circumventing the legislative process, voters can create law by
initiative without the same scrutiny and mechanisms that
accompany enacted legislation. 10
This legislative bypass, no doubt, produces several ramifications that sharpen the distinction between representative and
voter-made law. 11 Perhaps the most notable of these distinctions
is found in the subject matter covered by ballot initiatives. In
many instances, initiatives have raised issues that elected
representatives had previously shunned because the issues are

8.
Three forms of direct democracy exist in the United States today; they are
initiative, referendum, and recall. CRONIN, supra note 6, at 2. The initiative allows
voters to place on the ballot a statutory measure or constitutional amendment "by
filing a petition bearing a required number of valid citizen signatures." Id. The
referendum submits a proposed or existing law to the electorate for approval or
rejection. Id. The recall enables voters "to remove or discharge a public official from
office by filing a petition bearing a specified number of valid signatures demanding
a vote on the official's continued tenure in office." Id.; see also Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510-13 (1990) (discussing the
initiative and referendum forms of direct democracy).
The focus of this Article is voter lawmaking through initiative because it alone
allows voters to both write and pass laws. Therefore, any references to direct
democracy hereafter will be to the initiative only, unless otherwise indicated.
9.
By "representative democracy" I am referring. to a system of government in
which groups of citizens elect individuals to a political body to represent them in
making and deciding law.
10.
For example, in California the initiative can neither be amended once it has
qualified for the ballot nor be subjected to public hearings; thus, the initiative lacks
the legislative "benefits" of both amendment through compromise and informationgathering through hearing. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 79-80. For a
critique of the initiative process and suggestions for reform, see id. at 20-29.
11.
A wide array ofliterature addresses the distinctions and similarities between
direct and representative democracy. Some works criticize direct democracy as a form
of lawmaking, while others recognize its shortcomings but advocate it over the
legislative process as a means of serving the public interest. Compare DAYID B.
MAGIEBY, DIRECT l.mISU\'ltON: VOllNG ON BAu.ar PRoFOSmONS IN 1HE UNTIID SrA'llS 188-00
(1984) (arguing that the use of initiative has harmed the political process by
weakening political parties and legislatures, accelerating growth of single-issue
politics, and enhancing special interest group power) and Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978)
(arguing that reliance on referenda and initiatives "poses a threat to individual rights"
and "creates a crisis for the rights ofracial and other discrete minorities") with Richard
Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1367-71 (1985) (reviewing
MAGLEBY, supra, and arguing that direct democracy is valuable for increasing
representativeness of government and that it should coexist with the legislative
process) and Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in
Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 931-37 (1988) (suggesting that
representative democracy is more likely to produce results that deviate from optimal
outcomes than are plebiscites).
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divisive within the legislature or controversial within the electorate.12 Not surprisingly, voter initiatives have become the
refuge for citizens who believe that local and state legislators
are simply unresponsive to their fundamental concerns. 13
One such group -of voters is the Americans Against Human
Suffering (AAHS), formed in 1986 to promote the legalization
of physician-aid-in-dying. 14 Frustrated in their efforts to attract
legislative attention to the plight of terminally ill patients who
wish to hasten their death through medical means, AAHS
mounted a successful campaign to place the issue of voluntary
active euthanasia on the California state ballot in November
1992. 15 While the initiative itself was defeated by a margin of

12. One study reveals that the most common topics of initiative activity are
governmental and political process reform, civil liberties, and environmental protection.
See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 58-69. Citizen lawmaking in the political
process arena is logically linked to topics oflegislative diviseness, if not utter conflict
of interest. Term limits serve as a recent example. By the end of 1994, 22 states had
enacted some form of congressional term limits; in 21 of these states, the measures
were enacted by a direct vote of the people. United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1909.n.39 (1995).
Regarding influence of constituent approval on proposed legislation, it is likely that
any bill will have its supporters and detractors who will align themselves with
individual legislators to advocate passage or defeat of a particular measure. Competing
business and special interest agendas, for example, can lead to legislative deadlock,
preventing lawmakers from effectively dealing with controversial topics. In this
instance, the ballot box seems a viable solution, whereby advocates and opponents
can bypass legislative wrangling and appeal directly to the public for a vote on the
merits. Yet, some would argue that the initiative's ability to help settle controversial
issues is highly questionable. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 61~2
(describing the 1990 California ballot which hosted four initiatives dealing with
environmental reform; two were proposed by environmental groups, while two were
business-backed counter initiatives, but all were rejected by voters).
13. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 5~ (outlining various political
developments that have spurred the growth of initiatives, including legislative inaction
on issues of importance to voters).
14. See Katherine Bishop, Backers Fail to Get Lethal Injection Bid on California
Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1988, at A23. After its formation, AAHS worked to place
an initiative on the 1988 California ballot that would have legalized physician-assisted
death for terminally ill patients, but the group failed to secure the required number
of signatures. Id.
15. See Lori Olszewski, State Prop. 161 Would Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide, S.F. CHRON.,July, 10, 1992, atA23 (reporting that, by July 1992, supporters had
gathered 567 ,000 signatures to qualify the physician-aid-in-dying Proposition 161 for
the ballot). In the mid-1980s, one of the founders of AAHS, Robert Risley, approached
several legislators in Sacramento, requesting that they sponsor legislation to enable
physicians to assist terminally ill patients in hastening their deaths. Allan Parachini,
Bringing Euthanasia Issue to the Ballot Box: Group Sponsors State Initiative to
Legalize "Physician-Assisted Suicide," L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1987, pt. V, at 1, 10.
According to a spokesperson for one of the lawmakers approached, "Risley's proposal
seemed too controversial and politically risky to stand any chance of getting through
the Legislature." Id.
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fifty-four percent to forty-six percent, 16 the lobby group has
already announced its intention to place a similar measure
on the California state ballot in 1996. 17 Moreover, AAHS was
not the first group to place a euthanasia initiative on a state
ballot. In 1991, the Washington Citizens for Death with
Dignity gathered the requisite signatures to place Initiative
119, providing for legalization of physician-aid-in-dying, on
that state's ballot. 18 Finally, in the most recent attempt to
gain statutory authority for physician-aid-in-dying, on November 8, 1994, voters in Oregon approved Measure 16, 19 the

16. See George de Lama, States Thke Pulse on Morality: Oregon Anti-Gay Measure
Fails; Abortion-Rights Issues Gain, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1992, at 18. The California
initiative, Proposition 161, would have permitted mentally competent adults who had
been diagnosed as terminally ill to write a revocable directive authorizing their doctors
to terminate their lives in a "painless, humane and dignified manner." The California
Death with Dignity Act § 2525.1 (voter initiative rejected 1992) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Death with Dignity Act].
The measure also would have provided immunity for doctors and healthcare professionals and facilities from civil or criminal liability after following the provisions of
a patient directive. Id. § 2525.9. Some political observers believe that the initiative
was defeated chiefly because voters feared the measure "lacked sufficient safeguards
against abuse." de Lama, supra, at 18.
17. Americans for Death with Dignity Thrgets Law Reform in 1996, PR Newswire,
May 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. The lobby group
changed its name to"Americans for Death with Dignity" and reportedly strengthened
its supporter base by adding the following people to its board of directors: Betty Rollin,
television reporter and author of Last Wish; Charlotte Ross, founder and, for 25 years,
director of the Suicide Prevention and Crisis Center of San Mateo County, California;
and two physicians. Id. The group's mission statement is as follows:
To create a legal right in the USA so that every mentally competent adult has
the choice of a physician-assisted humane and dignified death when he or she
becomes terminally ill.

Id.
18. See B.D. Colen, Right to Die: The War's Just Begun, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1991,
at 122. Like the California measure, .Washington Initiative 119 was defeated by a
margin of 54% to 46%. Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide
and Euthanasia Among Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89,
89 (1994). In 1994, euthanasia supporters in Washington were encouraged by the
decision of a federal district judge that struck down a state law prohibiting doctors
from helping patients to commit suicide. See Cynthia Hubert, Euthanasia Advocates
Win Two Key Court Rulings: Kevorkian Decision, Washington Case Indicate Growing
Acceptance of "Right to Die" Principles, S.F. EXAMINER, May 22, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The Washington decision, Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), was subsequently reversed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 1995). On August 1, 1995, the court ordered
a rehearing en bane of the case. Compassion in Dyingv. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th
Cir. 1995).
19. See U.S. Judge Keeps Oregon's New Suicide Law in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
28, 1994, at A5 (reporting that Measure 16 was approved by Oregon voters by a 51%
to 49% margin).
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nation's first law authorizing physicians to assist in the
suicide of terminally ill patients. 20
What is interesting about the public debate over euthanasia21
is not so much that it is going on, but rather where the debate
is taking place. Euthanasia, like other bioethical legal issues 22
20. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, ch. 3, 1995 Or. Laws 12 [hereinafter
Measure 16). Unlike the prior Calj.fornia and Washington initiatives, Measure 16 is
limited to a physician' assisting in the suicide of a terminally ill patient by prescribing
a lethal dose of medication. See id. § 3.01, 1995 Or. Laws at 13. The physician is not
authorized to administer the drugs, id. § 3.14, 1995 Or. Laws at 14, as contemplated
in the other two states' measures. See Timothy Egan:, Suicide Law Placing Oregon
on Several Uncharted Paths, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at Al, B14.
Almost immediately after its passage, Measure 16 was challenged in federal court
by several plaintiffs, including two physicians and four terminally ill patients, on the
grounds that the law violates the United States Constitution as well as other federal
law. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (D. Or. 1994). On December 27, 1994, the
court granted a preliminary injunction blocking implementation of the law "until the
constitutional concerns are fully heard and analyzed." Id. On August 3, 1995, Judge
Michael Hogan ruled. that Measure 16 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and therefore permanently enjoined the voter-approved
practice of physician-assisted suicide. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439, 1439 (D. Or.
1995).
21. The public and academic debate surrounding the concept of physicians actively
and knowingly participating in their patients' deaths encompasses a host of issues,
including questions about terminology and semantics. Those who enter the "euthanasia" debate generally set forth their preference for terms and the behavior attached
thereto. For example, over 20 years ago, medical ethicist Joseph Fletcher proposed
a typology of forms of euthanasia, suggesting that the practice of a "good· death" could
be: (1) voluntary and direct, (2) voluntary but indirect, (3) direct but involuntary, and
(4) both indirect and involuntary. Joseph Fle~her, Ethics and Euthanasia, in To LIVE
AND To DIE: WHEN, WHY, AND How 113, 117-18 (Robert H. Williams ed., 1973). Another
theme in the debate over terminology focuses on whether the practice of physicianassisted dying should be categorized as either "passive" or "active" euthanasia.
Compare James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78,
79 (1975) (suggesting that there is no· moral difference between a physician actively
helping a patient to die or agreeing to withhold treatment) with Tom L. Beauchamp,
A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND
DYING 246, 247 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Seymour Perlin eds., 1978) (defending the
occasional importance of the active/passive distinction). To further complicate the
debate about proper euthanasia terminology, George Lundberg, editor of the Journal
of the American Medical Association, has identified six major types of euthanasia: (1)
passive, (2) semipassive, (3) semiactive, (4) accidental, (5) suicidal, and (6) active.
George D. Lundberg, "It's Over, Debbie" and the Euthanasia Debate, 259 JAMA 2142,
2143 (1988). For a discussion of the differences in the moral, factual, and interpretive
premises of euthanasia, see EIKE-RENNER W. KLUGE, THE ETHICS OF DELIBERATE DEATH
9-29 (1981).
I consider the practice of physician-assisted death as breaking into two categories:
(1) assisted suicide, where the physician provides the means of death but is not the
final agent in the patient's death, and (2) voluntary active euthanasia, where the
physician provides the means of death and is the final agent in the patient's death.
These two practices-physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia-comprise what I refer to as "physician-aid-in-dying." This latter term connotes
the ways in which a physician can help his terminally ill patients achieve a less
painful, more accelerated death.
22. The term "bioethics" is defined as "[t)he study of the ethical and moral questions involved in the applic.ation of new biological and medical findings, as in the fields
of genetic engineering, neurobiology, and drug research." AMERICAN HERITAGE
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that have preceded it, including abortion and the rights of
patients to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment,
involves a wide variety oflegal issues ranging from criminality
to constitutionality. Unlike previous bioethical issues, however,
euthanasia seems to be unique in its evasion of the judicial and
legislative processes that have produced a rich jurisprudence
of patient self-determination. In other words, while the law
surrounding the rights of patients to seek abortions or withdrawal of medical treatment has been defined by enacted
legislation and court opinions, the battle over euthanasia is
being staged at a grass-roots, populist level that evades, perhaps intentionally, the involvement of established political
processes.
This Article explores the practice and wisdom of regulating
bioethical choices through direct democracy. The intersection
between personal decision making and voter-generated law
has grown increasingly pronounced over the past several
years. 23 Given that the trend toward direct voter lawmaking
in this area is likely to continue, 24 it is essential to examine
the history, present practices, and future of direct democracy
and its impact on bioethical choices. Using the euthanasia
movement as a paradigm case, this Article examines the benefits and disadvantages of pursuing the legislation of selfdetermination through the electoral process. Efforts toward
the legalization of euthanasia serve as a~ excellent model for
this discussion because these efforts have been aimed at every
level of government, revealing much about the way citizens
and policymakers approach the regulation of personal decision
making. Part I explores the reasons why citizens and interest
groups have turned to direct democracy as a way of garnering
support for euthanasia, thereby turning away from more

180 (2d ed. 1985). By "bioethical legal issues" I am referring primarily to
matters that involve decision making about one's personal autonomy, decisions that
inevitably call into play one's ethical and moral principles.
23. For example, in 1991, Washington voters had the opportunity to vote on
physician-aid-in-dying. See supra. text accompanying note 18. In 1992, Californians
had the same opportunity. See supra. text accompanying note 15. In the abortion
arena, voters in at least nine states have been asked to cast ballots regarding some
aspect of reproductive rights. See Letter from Janet Crepps, State Coordinating
Counsel, Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, to the author (Aug. 3, 1993) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of La.w Reform) (listing Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington as states with
recent initiatives on abortion rights).
24. See supra. text accompanying note 17 (discussing current efforts to place
voluntary euthanasia initiative on the 1996 California ballot).
DICTIONARY
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traditional methods of obtaining legal rights. By comparing
the legislative and judicial successes of the so-called "right-todie" movement of the 1970s and 1980s with the relative failure
of euthanasia advocates to gain legalization, one begins to
understand the movement's current strategies.
Part II examines the history and practice of direct democracy. After briefly reviewing the impetus for instituting direct
democracy in our states in the early years of the twentieth
century, Part II discusses current criticisms of citizen lawmaking. In particular, concerns about voter competency, the
tyranny of the majority, and special interest domination are
discussed in the context of the euthanasia campaigns in
Washington and California. What emerges from this analysis
is the realization that lawmaking at the ballot box is no more
immune from the ravages of political wrangling than is legislating through representative democracy. Part II therefore con~
eludes that direct democracy is best utilized as a spur to
legislative action rather than as a replacement for the study
and compromise unique to our legislative process.·
Finally, Part III explores the question of whether democratic
lawmaking is an appropriate means for protecting bioethical
choices, particularly choices about the end of life. This question
is first tackled in the context of direct democracy as practiced
through ballot initiatives. Analysis of this question reveals that
lawmaking through the initiative process is particularly
problematic because it is available in less than half the states
in our nation, rendering universal access to reform impossible
at present. Part III then questions whether personal decisions,
particularly decisions about death, should ever be the subject
of legislation. Given that citizens in our nation have long
resisted legal interference with private preference, it is no
surprise that we would treat regulation of choice in death with
some degree of suspicion and hostility. Perhaps the optimal
outcome for the debate surrounding euthanasia would be for
supporters to turn away from the initiative process and advocate for a constitutionally protected right to choose aid-indying. Legal regulation of choice-in-dying would then be
governed by a threshold level of protection available to all
citizens, not just to those who go to the ballot box.
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I. JUDICIAL, STATUTORY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO
BIOETHICAL CHOICES: THE CASE OF EUTHANASIA

The term "bioethical choices" eludes precise definition but
nonetheless conjures up a vague concept that likely includes
decision making about one's mental and· physical well-being.
Throughout this century, and particularly throughout the past
twenty years, the concept ofbioethical choices has filtered into
our legal system, causing judges, legislators, and even voters
to consider how our laws can best respond to individual needs
and preferences. Since the 1970s, we have witnessed increasing
legal activity regarding bioethical choices, notably in the areas
of abortion and patient decision making.
In both of these bioethical areas, the legal response has been
comprehensive in that it has come from judicial, legislative,
and constitutional sources. Currently, every state has enacted
law regulating abortion, and within almost every state a c.ourt
has ruled on the applicability or advisability of such law. 25
Likewise, every state has passed legislation speaking to the
rights of patients to control their medical treatment, 26 and
courts in thirty-eight jurisdictions have discussed the issue of
patient self-determination. 27 Additionally; federal lawmakers
and judges have become involved in these bioethical areas.

25. See generally 1 ABoRTION IN THE UNITED SrATES: A CoMPILATION OF Si'ATE LEGISIATION (Howard A. Hood et al. eds., 1991) (setting forth the text of each state's abortion
statute and summarizing court opinions on abortion in each state). No co~rt decisions
on abortion exist in Hawaii, Idaho, New Hampshire, or Vermont. Id. at 121, 127-36,
387-88, 583.
26. Every state except Massachusetts and Michigan have enacted a living will
statute, which allows patients to direct their physicians to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment in the event of terminal illness. 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE
§§ 11.1, ll.22 tbl. 11-1 (2d ed. 1995). Every state except Alabama has enacted a health
care power-of-attorney statute, which enables patients to appoint another person to
make health care decisions on their behalf when they are unable to do so for
themselves. Id. §§ 12.1, 12.52 tbl. 12-1.
27.
2 MEISEL, supra note 26, § L 7 tbl. 1-1 (listing by state all right-to-die cases).
The appellate courts that have decided right-to-die cases can be found in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
The states whose trial courts have decided right-to-die cases are Alabama, Hawaii,
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Texas. Id.
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Congress has enacted abortion 28 and patients' rights legislation.29 The Supreme Court has grappled with both issues,
ultimately looking to the Constitution as a source for its rightsbased analysis. 30
In contrast to the substantial legal activity surrounding
individual decision making regarding pregnancy and withdrawal of treatment, until very recently, scant formal legal
attention has been paid to the issue·of euthanasia. 31 Despite

28.
While regulation of abortion has rested primarily with the states, Congress
has enacted legislation relating to abortion funding. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION:
THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 151, 197-228 (1990). Since 1976, Congress has prohibited the
use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid
program, except in special cases. Id. at 151-52. Congress regularly enacts this
restriction as a "Hyde Amendment," named after its original congressional sponsor,
Representative Henry Hyde, a Republican from Illinois. Id. at 151, 153. For a
discussion of the constitutionality of the "Hyde Amendment," see Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 306-27 (1980) .
. 29.
In 1990, Congress enacted the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), Pub.
L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388-115, 1388-204 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(O(l), 1396a(w) (Supp. V 1993)). The PSDA requires hospitals, longterm care facilities, hospices, home health care agencies, and health maintenance
organizations receiving Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement to provide adult patients
with written information about their legal rights to accept or refuse medical or
surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance directives, such as living wills.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(0(1), 1396a(w) (Supp. V 1993).
30. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (1992) (affirming
the essential holding ofRoe v. Wade that the Constitution protects a woman's decision
to terminate her pregnancy before fetal viability without undue interference from the
state); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (holding that
a competent adult has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment).
31. This statement may seem surprising in light of the barrage of news coverage
afforded Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the retired Michigan pathologist who, since 1990, has
"assisted" in the deaths of more than 20 people. See Top Michigan Court Reinstates
.Assisted-Suicide Ban, for Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1994, at A21 [hereinafter Top
Michigan Court]. Further indication of the extensive media coverage of Kevorkian is
that a search in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws and Arcnws Files, of the term
"Kevorkian" revealed 874? stories in its data bank as of August 14, 1995. Another
physician whose actions and writings brought attention to the question ofphysicianaid-in-dying is Dr. Timothy Quill, a New York doctor who publicly detailed his role
in assisting a 45-year-old leukemia victim to end her life. See Timothy E. Quill,
Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
691, 693 (1991) (describing how the doctor prescribed barbiturates for a long-term
patient, suspecting that she would use them to end her life). The 1991 Washington,
1992 California, and 1994 Oregon ballot initiatives asking voters to endorse physician-aid-in-dying also raised public consciousness and debate about euthanasia. See
supra text accompanying notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
Yet, despite this attention in the news, the subject of physician-aid-in-dying has
been the focus of only two appellate court opinions, one in Michigan, People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 739 (Mich. 1994) (finding constitutional the State's
effort to ban physician-assisted suicide), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995), and the
other in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Compassion in Dying v.
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the apparent intensity of current public interest in physicianaid-in-dying, few legislators or appellate court judges have
given the practice the kind of high-profile, thoughtful review
accorded other bioethical issues. There are at least two possible explanations for this lack of official attention. First, and
particularly in the case of legislators, it may be that, despite
a significant degree of public support, 32 lawmakers do not
wish to endorse the cause of voluntary active euthanasia
because they believe that it is not an issue for which a consensus can be negotiated at this time. Second, despite longstanding support and concern for the issue, the modern euthanasia
movement may be perceived to be at a nascent stage where
headway into legislative and judicial changes is still a long
way off. 33 In either case, frustration with the lack of progress
in advancing their agenda has caused euthanasia supporters
to take a grass-roots approach to legalizing physician-aid-indying, asking voters to help legalize the practice state by
state. A comparison of the current euthanasia movement with
the development of laws surrounding the rights of patients to
control administration of life-support treatment reveals that
the physician-aid-in-dying movement is unlikely to follow the
same path to state and federal lawmaking that defined the
"right-to-die" movement.

Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir.) (reversing a district court opinion holding
such a ban unconstitutional), reh'g granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition,
two trial courts have issued notable opinions concerning physician-assisted suicide.
See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1994) (permanently enjoining voterapproved law allowing physician-assisted suicide); Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78,
85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding the New York assisted-suicide ban constitutional as
applied to physicians aiding competent, terminally ill adults). As to lawmakers, those
few state legislative bodies that have grappled with the issue have done so only by
way of prohibiting or disfavoring the practice, usually through the state's patients'
rights laws. See infra note 77.
32. See infra note 111.
33.
Currently the most visible organization promoting physician-aid-in-dying is
the National Hemlock Society, formed in 1980. See DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT: THE
PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELlvERANCE AND ~ISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING 180 (1991). As
of 1990, it had a membership of 38,000 in 70 chapters across the country. Id. For a
thorough discussion of the euthanasia movement in the United States, including the
major individual and organizational players, see generally DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN
WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING EUTHANASIA (1986).
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A. The Path to Legislative Action: Personal Stories.
Mix with National Events
In his book The Right to Die,34 Henry Glick details the
growth of the right to die as a social and political issue. 35
Throughout his book, Professor Glick focuses primarily on the
laws and high court opinions that address the rights of patients
and their surrogate decisionmakers to make decisions about
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. 36 This
right, which Professor Glick calls the "right to die," 37 has now
worked its way into our medicolegal culture, but its entrance
into the legal world was probably as much due to the efforts
of individuals with a personal stake in the matter as it was due
to genuine political interest.
Professor Glick details the path of right-to-die bills in three
states: California, Florida, and Massachusetts. 38 The sponsor
of each bill was moved by some personal experience to create
law giving patients more control over their health care. For
example, in California, the first state in the nation to enact a
living will law, 39 the state senator who championed the cause
did so because he had met the issue several times in his
personal life before entering politics. 40 Before he became a
California State senator in 1974,41 Barry Keene had been asked
by a neighbor to search for a way to end the neighbor's wife's
medical treatment for cancer. 42 Keene tried but was ultimately
unable to help his neighbors avoid the nasogastric tube and
ventilator support that they wanted withdrawn. 43 Later, in
1972, Keene faced this same dilemma when his mother-in-law
developed cancer and faced a similar life-prolonging medical

34.
HENRY R GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE: PoLICY INNOVATION AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES
(1992).
35.
Id. at ix.

36. Id.
37.
Professor Glick explains at the outset of his book that the term, "right to die,"
can relate to a range of activities, including assisted suicide and active euthanasia.
Id. at 8. His research, however, focuses primarily on the right to withdraw or withhold
treatment. See id. at 8-12.
38.
Id. at 92-132.
39.
Id. at 93; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1995).
40.
See GLICK, supra note 34, at 93-94.
41.
Id. at 94.
42.
Id. at 93.
43.
Id. at 93-94.
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regimen. 44 Although she had signed a medical directive to limit
treatment, nothing required her physician or hospital to honor
such a request. 45
When Keene was elected in 1974, he was appointed to chair
the Committee on Health. 46 Shortly thereafter, he introduced
a bill that simply stated that "every person has the right to die
without.prolongation oflife by medical means."47 The California
Pro-Life Council ·and the California Catholic Conference immediately opposed the bill, and it was easily defeated. 48 Over
the next two years, Senator Keene worked to build a consensus
among supporters and opponents of treatment limitation, ultimately winning the tempered support of the Catholic lobby and
the California Medical Association. 49
In 1976, Keene introduced a new proposal, this one more
modest and specific than the 1974 version. 50 As the bill was
being debated and amended in Sacramento, 51 an event occurred

44. Id. at 94.
45. Id.
46. ·Id. Professor Glick describes Senator Keene's meteoric rise to power in
California's two-party competitive legislature as follows:
Keene was no ordinary freshman senator. Very early in his legislative career,
he and four other newcomers had cast the deciding votes to elect the speaker
. of the assembly who repaid the favor by appointing the five to chair various
legislative committees. Keene chose the Committee on Health and the speaker
assured him that Keene's new living will bill would be referred to Keene's
committee, and that the issue would receive a hearing and leadership support.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
See id.
49. Id. at 95. Despite the support of certain religious groups, Senator Keene did
not win the support of the California Pro-Life Council. Id. In its view, any government
policy that suggested limitations on life-sustaining medical treatment was the "first
step on a slippery slope" to active euthanasia and extermination of undesirables. Id.
Members of the group demonstrated near Keene's office, hanged him in effigy, and
likened him to Adolf Hitler on handbills. Id. According to Glick, "At a committee
hearing opponents placed a copy of William Shirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
on the witness table." Id.
50. See id. at 94-96.
51. The Keene Bill was amended nine times before it was enacted into law. See
id. at 97. Professor Glick states that Keene accepted many amendments offered by
the California Catholic Conference in exchange for dropping its opposition. See id. at
96-97. These amendments included: making living wills inapplicable to pregnant
women; requiring extensive provisions for witnesses; requiring a denouncement of
active euthanasia; requiring the certification of two physicians for a diagnosis of
terminal illness; establishing the validity of a living will for only five years from the
date of signature; and requiring a diagnosed terminally ill person to wait 14 days
before making a living will. Id. at 96.
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that did more than any single bill could do to focus the nation's
attention on the rights of patients to withdraw medical treatment. On March 31, 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared that the parents of Karen Quinlan had the right,
grounded in both constitutional and common law, to authorize
removal of their comatose daughter's respirator. 52 The Quinlan
case created a "window of opportunity" for the pending Keene
bill to gain easy passage later that year. 53
A story of personal interest and public focus on the issue of
treatment withdrawal also explains Florida's enactment of
right-to-die legislation. In 1967, novice state house representative Dr. Walter Sackett, a family physician for several decades
before running for office, introduced the first right-to-die
measure ever to be placed on any governmental agenda in the
United States. 54 The measure would have amended the Florida
constitution to include the phrase "the right to die with dignity. "55 Like Senator Keene, Representative Sackett's interest in
the issue developed from his personal interactions with patients who were just beginning to experience the downside of
modern medical advances. 56 Unlike Keene, however, Sackett
did not meet with the same popularity, and his proposal was
debated in the Florida House for just one hour before it was
voted down. 57 As in California, Florida right-to-die proponents
attracted extreme opposition from right-to-life organizations
and the Florida Catholic .Conference. 58 Despite this intense
opposition, Sackett continued to introduce right-to-die bills into
the legislature, but none was enacted during his tenure, which
ended in 1976. 59
Various liberal Democratic legislators from southern Florida carried on the Florida legislative drive for right-to-die

52. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
53. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 98.
54. See id. at 104.
55. Id. at 105.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 106.
59. Id. at 105-09. Representative Sackett was depicted as a "one-issue legislator
with photographs in local newspapers showing him napping during legislative
sessions." Id. at 109. Nevertheless, his persistence in this unpopular arena kept the
right-to-die issue before the Florida government. Professor Glick writes that, "[elven
though [Sackett's) controversial bills were defeated, and he was the only person in
the state visibly supporting legislation, his tenacity attracted media and public
attention and kept the issue on the decisional agenda, and, in time, the right to die
became official policy." Id.
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legislation after Sackett's defeat. 60 The final impetus for
enactment of such a law came not from an out-of-state court
decision but rather from a series of pronouncements from the
Florida appellate courts. 61 In 1980, the Florida Supreme
Court became the fourth state supreme court in the nation to
hand down a decision involving the right to die. 62 In Satz v.
Perlmutter, 63 the court held that a competent, terminally ill
patient had the right to refuse continued medical treatment. 64
In its opinion, the court demanded that the Legislature act,
stating that "[i]t is the type [of] issue which is more suitably
addressed in the legislative forum, where fact finding can be
less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions
and disciplines can be presented and synthesized."65
Despite this stern judicial warning, it was not until 1984,
following another well-publicized court opinion, 66 that the
Florida Legislature finally passed its first right-to-die bill. 67
Prior to 1984, sixteen other states had enacted some type of
legislation addressing the rights of terminally ill patients to be
free of unwanted medical treatment. 68 In 1984 and 1985, an
additional nineteen states enacted some type of living will
law. 69 This legislative surge in the mid-1980s is most likely
60. See id.
61.
Id.
62. See id. at 110.
63.
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
64. Id. at 360.
65. Id.
66.
In 1983, a Florida appellate court held that a legal guardian of an incompetent, comatose, terminally ill patient who has executed a living will could be
authorized to remove life-sustaining treatment only after applying to a trial court for
authorization and presenting evidence of the patient's intent. John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). On
May 24, 1984, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling, finding that
judicial authorization is not necessary for a patient's custodian to make decisions on
behalf of an incompetent patient, regardless of whether the patient had executed a
living will. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926
(Fla. 1984).
67.
GLICK, supra note 34, at 112-14; see FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 765.302-.310 (Harrison
1994 & Supp. 1995) (entitled the Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida). Like the
first California law, see supra note 39 and accompanying text, the Florida bill reflected
compromise provisions intended to win the support, or at least to avoid the opposition,
of the Catholic Church. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 112. The Florida Catholic Conference found important "a statement ofintent supporting life; a requirement that sustenance (food and hydration) be provided to all patients; application of the law to
terminal patients only; language against mercy killing; and nullification of a living
will in the case of pregnancy. n Id. at 113.
68. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 170.
69.
Id. By the mid-1980s another type of right-to-die statute, one creating a durable power of attorney for health care, was beginning to appear in state legislatures
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attributable to the new position taken by the Catholic Church
with respect to patients' rights. 70 In 1984, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops softened its approach to right-to-die
legislation, 71 perhaps in response to numerous state court opinions favoring patients' rights in this area. 72 As a result of this
change on the national level, several state Catholic conferences
began drafting legislation instead of opposing it. 73 What this
meant for the right-to-die movement was that its chief opponent was now an ally, albeit a somewhat reluctant and watchful one. 74
Given the history and ultimate success of those seeking to
give patients more control over the provision and withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment, can euthanasia proponents hope
for the same slow but steady progress toward legislative

across the country. See A.LAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE§ 10.12 tbl. 10-1 (1989). A
durable power of attorney for health care authorizes another person (the attorney-infact, agent, or proxy) to make medical decisions on behalf of a patient (principal or
grantor) who is unable to make those decisions due to lack of mental capacity. 2
MEISEL, supra note 26, §§ 12.1-.2. As of 1989, 15 states had enacted such a statute.
MEISEL, supra, § 10.12 tbl. 10-1. As of 1995, every state except Alabama had enacted
such a statute. 2 MEISEL, supra note 26, § 12.52 tbl. 12-1.
70. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 171.
71. See id. at 171-72 ..
72. See, e.g., Bartlingv. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421A.2d1334 (Del. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga.
1984); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Estate of
Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738
(Wash. 1983).
73. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 171.
74.
The story of the right-to-die movement in Massachusetts, the third jurisdiction Professor Glick discusses, is similar to that observed in Florida. See id. at 120-28.
Professor Glick writes:
One of the early sponsors [of legislation] was motivated by a 1977 court case in
his own district involving a brain dead teenager injured in an automobile
accident who was being maintained on life-support systems. The county medical
examiner had refused to permit [the machines'] removal due to concern for the
legal rights of the motorist who had caused the accident.
Id. at 120. At the same time, a state supreme court decision, Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), allowing a state
hospital to withhold leukemia treatment from an elderly and severely retarded
patient, spurred public interest. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 121. Thereafter, patient
rights legislation was introduced during every legislative session, but, because of the
Massachusetts Catholic Conference's opposition efforts, it was not until 1990 that
Massachusetts had its first right-to-die law, a health care proxy statute. See id. at
120, 126.
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legitimization? In my estimation, the answer is no, not at this
time. While it is highly possible that several legislators across
the country will encounter a loved one, friend, or constituent
who futilely seeks physician-aid-in-dying, it is unlikely that
such an experience will spur those lawmakers into fighting for
legislative action. Perhaps, in the legislative mind, empowering
patients to end their lives is perceived as different from
empowering patients to authorize their physicians to end their
lives. 75 Transferring instrumentality from patient to physician,
seen as logical and practical by some, may cause a reaction in
legislators unseen when living will laws were being debated.
For this reason, perhaps euthanasia advocates view patience and persistence with the legislative process as a poor
use of their resources and thus have turned to the voters
themselves to carry the legalization banner. A review oflegislative forays in the euthanasia arena reveals a smattering of
bills but no. perceptible degree oflegislative support. 76 In fact,
many state legislatures have enacted legislation banning or
disfavoring the practice. 77 It is this legislative unfriendliness

75. A glimpse into the legislative mindset on euthanasia is revealed in the events
following the 1985 conviction of Roswell Gilbert, a 76-year-old Florida man who shot
his wife to end her suffering from Alzheimer's Disease and osteoporosis. See Michael
Moline, Senator Predicts Legislative Silence on Mercy Killing, UPI, Nov. 5, 1985,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Shortly after Gilbert's conviction,
Florida State Senator Peter Weinstein, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
predicted that despite widespread sympathy for the "mercy killer," the legislature "will
remain silent on euthanasia rather than risk giving any impression it condones the
practice." Id. For a more extensive discussion of the case of Roswell Gilbert, see infra
text accompanying notes 128-30.
76. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
77.
Statutes in 26 states mention euthanasia in their legislation regarding
living wills or healthcare decisions. A typical statute provides: "This chapter does
not condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing or euthanasia." See ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.12.080(0 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 20-17-210(g) (Michie 1991); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-14-504(4) (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 765.309 (Harrison 1994); HAW. REV.
STAT.§ 327D-13 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE§ 39-152 (Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144A.11(6) (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 65-28,109 (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.lO(A) (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(c) (1994);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 201D, § 12 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 1458.14 (West Supp. 1995);
MO. REV. STAT.§ 459.055(5) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 50-9-205(7) (1993); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 449.670 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 137-H:l3 (Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT.
CODE§ 23-06.4-01 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2133.12(0) (Anderson Supp. 1995);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.2(C) (West Supp. 1995); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5402(b) (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-9(0 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN.§ 34-12D-20 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 75-2-1118 (1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-208 (1994); Emergency Medical
Services Do Not Resuscitate Order Act, 1994 S.C. Acts 5068, 5071 (to be codified at
S.C. CODE ANN.§ 44-78-50).
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that differentiates the right-to-die movement from the current public caucus supporting voluntary active euthanasia.

B. Legislative Efforts Toward Voluntary Active
Euthanasia: A Cause Non-Celebre
1. A History of Euthanasia Legislation Throughout the
Century-Although proposals for laws permitting physicians
to withdraw treatment did not reach state legislatures until
1968,78 the first bill to seek legalization of voluntary euthanasia was introduced in the Ohio legislature in 1906. 79 The bill
was to apply to adults of sound mind who were fatally hurt,
terminally ill, or suffering from extreme pain without hope of
recovery. 80 In such cases, a physician would be permitted to ask
the patient in the presence of three witnesses if she wished to
die. 81 If the answer was yes, three other physicians would be
required to confirm the original prognosis before the patient
could be put to death. 82 Although the bill did not emerge from
committee, 83 it did begin an uphill, unpopular, and as yet
unsuccessful battle for the legalization of physician-aid-indying.
The next effort to legalize euthanasia in the United States84
came in 1937 with the introduction of a bill in the Nebraska
Legislature. 85 The bill was given to a committee, where it
78. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 62.
79. See 0. RmH RussEu.., F'REEooM 'ID DIE: MoRAL AND l..EGALAsPEcls OF EulHANAmA
60 (rev. ed. 1977); David R. Schanker, Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation,
and the Health Care Crisis, 68 IND. L.J. 977, 998 (1993). The January 24, 1906 New
York Times reports that Miss Anna Hall requested the bill following her mother's
miserable death. RUSSELL, supra, at 60. See generally Thane J. Messinger, A Gentle
and Easy Death: From Ancient Greece to Beyond Cruzan Toward a Reasoned Legal
Response to the Societal Dilemma of Euthanasia, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 181-213
(1993) (providing an in-depth discussion of the early Greco-Roman and Christian
influences on euthanasia, as well as contemporary historical background).
80.
RUSSELL, supra note 79, at 61.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83.
Messinger, supra note 79, at 189 (citing RUSSELL, supra note 79, at 60-61). A
New York Times editorial condemned the bill, calling it "something considerably worse
than ignorant folly-something that verges close upon, if not into, the criminal." Id.
at 189 n.148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84.
For a discussion of euthanasia legalization efforts in Great Britain, see id.
at 190-91.
85. See id. at 191. This bill was modeled after a 1936 British bill called the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill, which permitted adult patients suffering from incurable and
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remained. 86 One year later, in 1938, the Euthanasia Society of
America was formed in New York; 87 at the same time, a bill to
legalize euthanasia was introduced in the New York Legislature, and it was defeated in 1939. 88 New York euthanasia
advocates tried again in 1947 with a similar bill, but it too was
rejected. 89 At that point in our nation's history, reports of the
Nazi practice of euthanasia had a chilling effect on efforts to
legalize physician-assisted dying in the United States. 90 No
further legislative efforts were made until the late 1960s, about
the same time that the treatment withdrawal movement began.
In 1969, the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill was introduced in the
Idaho House of Representatives, seeking legalization of voluntary euthanasia when the patient suffered from an "irremediable condition."91 This bill was defeated despite its safeguards
against abuses. 92
Beginning in the early 1970s and continuing until the early
1990s, legislative attempts to legalize euthanasia were overshadowed by the significant effort to pass laws relating to
treatment withdrawal. 93 In fact, it was not until the mid-1980s,
when the Hemlock Society and its founder, Derek Humphry,
began working to bolster national support,94 that the legislative

fatal illnesses to request euthanasia by signing a form in the presence of two
witnesses. Id. at 190-91. The British bill contained numerous requirements, such as
submission of the form to a "euthanasia referee," issuance by the referee of a certificate to be presented to a special court, fact finding by the court, and the presence of
an official witness after judicial issuance of further certificates. Id.; see also GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 333-34 (1970) (also describing
the bill). The Nebraska bill was similar to the British bill except for two additional
provisions: (1) the Nebraska bill included coverage of those who were "helpless and
suffering from the infirmities of old age," and (2) the Nebraska bill allowed next-of-kin
to apply on behalf of mentally incompetent adults, and likewise a parent or guardian
could apply on behalf of a minor whose condition was incurable or fatal. Messinger,
supra note 79, at 191 (citing JERRY B. Wn.soN, DEATH BY DECISION: THE MEDICAL, MORAL,
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 32-33 (1975)).
86. Messinger, supra note 79, at 191-92. There has since been no action on this
bill. Id. at 192 n.166.
87. Schanker, supra note 79, at 999.
88. Id. The New York bill was modeled after the .British bill described in supra
note 85. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. But see Messinger, supra note 79, at 195 (reporting that revelation of the
Nazi German practices seemingly had little effect on American public opinion about
voluntary euthanasia). For a summary of the practices and consequences of euthanasia by Nazi German doctors during World War II, see id. at 192-95.
91.
RUSSELL, supra note 79, at 192.
92. See HUMPHRY & WICKETI', supra note 33, at 88.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 46-74.
94. See HUMPHRY, supra note 33, at 180.
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euthanasia efforts became perceptible. 95 Those efforts took a
slightly different turn from previous attempts. Instead of
approaching individual legislators, who seemed hostile to the
idea of physicians as "agents" of death96 and who had rarely
agreed to present the issue to· their legislative colleagues,
supporters turned to those believed to be in the best position
to enact laws legalizing euthanasia: ·the voters themselves. 97
Armed with public opinion polls that showed growing support
for the right to voluntary active euthanasia, 98 leaders in the
national Hemlock Society and individual state organizations
in Washington and California sought to harness this public
approval in these direct democracy states. The Hemlock Society
and its sister organizations worked to place the issue of doctor
aid-in-dying on those states' electoral agendas. Although they
were successful in placing the issue before the voters· in Washington in 1991 and in California in 1992, neither initiative
received enough votes to become law. 99 To date, no state has
successfully passed a law legalizing voluntary active euthanasia.100
In comparing the path traveled by proponents of euthanasia
with that of living-will advocates, what emerges is not so much
a picture of divergence but an image of a single purpose in
which success in the latter arena was propelled by attention
to the former. Withdrawal of treatment legislation is a byproduct of euthanasia legislation efforts developed in the
context of a dramatically enhanced technological era. The fact
that the first euthanasia bill appeared in this country some

95. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
96. The negative image of a physician as an agent of death (as opposed to a
positive image of a physician using learned skills to end a patient's suffering) has
often been invoked by euthanasia opponents. See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, Can We
Return Death to Disease?, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (Supp.), Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 4, 6
(arguing that a physician's historical and social role has been to cure and comfort
patients, never to end life).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
98. See infra note 111.
99. See supra notes 16, 18.
100. AB noted previously, on November 8, 1994, Oregon voters approved Initiative
Measure 16, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, a ballot proposition authorizing
physician-assisted suicide. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The Oregon
measure, unlike the Washington and California initiatives, did not authorize physicians to administer a lethal dose of medication to a dying patient, i.e. to euthanize
the patient. See Egan, supra note 20, at Bl4. Instead, Measure 16 merely authorized
physicians to prescribe medication for their terminally ill patients to self-administer.
Id. Although this law passed, it has been permanently enjoined. Lee v. Oregon, 891
F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995).
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thirty years before the first treatment withdrawal bill 101
illustrates that, until the 1960s, our society had no need for
retreat from life-sustaining treatment because virtually none
was available. Treatment that seems so common today, such
as respirators and the provision of nutrition and hydration
through artificial tubes, simply was not standard care until
well into the 1970s. 102 It was not until patients began to linger
in what Justice Brennan called the "twilight zone" 103 that the
need for treatment withdrawal legislation became apparent.
This analysis of the legislative activity surrounding euthanasia as a long-term movement with recent derivative success
· raises questions about the future of legislative activity in this
area. Will euthanasia supporters be encouraged by the successes of the right-to-die movement, or will those successes
highlight the legislative failings of the current movement? My
own observations lead me to conclude that proponents will
move away from state legislatures for changes in the law and
will look increasingly toward two other groups: voters who can
enact physician-aid-in-dying legislation and judges who can
rule on the legality of statutes currently making the practice
of euthanasia unlawful. To support this conclusion, I offer the
following evidence of recent legislative and judicial activity in
the euthanasia arena.
2. Recent Legislative Activity Surrounding EuthanasiaSince Jack Kevorkian and Timothy Quill raised the practice of
physician-aid-in-dying to the level of a national controversy, 104
surprisingly little formal legislative debate has focused on the

101. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
102. See OFFICE OF 'fEcHNOLOGY AssES>MENT, US. U>NGRE$, LIFE&JsrAINING 'fEcHNOlr
OGIES AND THE ELDERLY 209, 275 (1987). The impact that these two types of medical
advances have had on medical jurisprudence is evidenced by the fact that almost every
"right-to-die" case brought before an appellate court in this country has involved
withdrawal of a respirator or artificial food and hydration. See GLICK, supra note 34,
at 143-45. Interestingly, only a few of the eilrly patients' rights cases involved
withholding of treatment, see, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass. 1977) (withholding chemotherapy from retarded
adult patient), but in the past several years a majority of treatment-related cases have
focused on withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, see, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270-78 (1990) (discussing state cases dealing with
terminaton oflife-sustaining treatment). What this legal landscape may show is that,
as more patients, physicians, and hospitals learn about the right to refuse treatment,
less conflict arises over this issue. Proponents of the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment can only hope that the substantial litigation surrounding withdrawal of
treatment will more firmly establish it as an unquestioned patient right.
103. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J.; dissenting).
104. See supra note 31.
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issue. As of June 1994, seven states had introduced bills to
legalize some form of physician-aid-in-dying. 105 None of the
bills has become law. In contrast, several states have recently
enacted laws to ensure that any physician's attempt to aid
dying patients in achieving an earlier death will be considered
a violation of law .106
Lackluster legislative support for voluntary euthanasia,
particularly apparent when compared with the flurry of activity in state houses across the country following the decision of
In re Quinlan, 107 likely can be attributed to legislative ambivalence or timidity in this area. Anecdotal evidence suggests

105. The seven states are Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Oregon, and Vermont. See S.F. 2066, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (Iowa 1992) (introduced by
Senator Sturgeon in early 1992 and allowing a physician to provide voluntary
assistance in dying if a patient is mentally competent and suffering a terminal
condition); S.P. 453, 116th Leg., 1st Reg. Seas. (Me. 1993) (introduced by Senator
Cahill in 1992 and 1993 and providing for medically assisted death for terminal
competent adult patients likely to die within a short period of time); H.R. 5415, 86th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1991) (introduced by Representative Wallace in 1991 and
providing a process for requesting and authorizing, or refusing, aid-in-dying); H.B.
395, 153d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1993) (introduced by Representative Guest in 1993
and permitting a terminally ill patient with an irreversible illness to request from his
doctor medication which the patient would self-administer); S.B. 1141, 66th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 1991) (introduced by Senator Roberts and allowing a competent adult to
request physician assistance in ending her life if she is suffering an illness that would
cause death in six months); H. 470, 62d Leg., 1st Sess. (Vt. 1993) (introduced by
Representative Corren and others and allowing physicians to assist patients in
committing suicide). Apparently, Hawaii Assemblywoman Joan Hayes has introduced
a bill that would amend the Hawaii living will act to permit people to agree in advance
to aid-in-dying if they are terminally ill. See Parachini, supra note 15, pt. V, at 1.
106. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-31 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995)
(amending the crime of "inducement to commit suicide" to include assisted suicide
when a person either intentionally offers and provides the means or commits a
physical act that enables another to commit suicide); IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-42-1-2.5
(West Supp. 1995) (creating the felony of assisting suicide); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 752.1027 (West Supp. 1995) (creating the offense of assisting suicide and amending
related provisions). By its own terms, the Michigan law was to expire six months after
the State Commission on Death and Dying made a recommendation to the Legislature.
Id. § 752.1027(5). The Commission was originally slated to issue its report in May
1994. See Top Michigan Court, supra note 31, at A21. Although the Commission failed
to reach a consensus on the topic of physician-assisted suicide, see Michigan Senate
Moues to Ban Assisted Suicides, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1994, at A12, the Michigan
Supreme Court declared assisted suicide a crime even in the absence of a specific
statute banning the act. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 738-39 (Mich. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
107. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). As noted previously,
in the first three years following the activities of Dr. Kevorkian and Dr. Quill, no
legislature successfully passed a law legalizing or decriminalizing physician-assisted
suicide. See supra note 31. In contrast, in the three years following Quinlan, ten
states enacted some type of treatment withdrawal legislation. See GLICK, supra note
34, at 170.
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that, even when legislators favor legalizing voluntary euthanasia, they are unlikely to introduce such a bill. For example,
during 1992 hearings before the Iowa Legislature, Dr. John G.
Westover, President of the National Hemlock Society, testified
as follows: "Several years ago, Mr. Willie Brown, Speaker of
the California Assembly, admonished an audience against
seeking a Humane and Dignified Death Act through a ballot
initiative instead of through the Assembly. Still, while he
favored personal autonomy, he would not introduce a medical
aid-in-dying bill. "108
Speaker Brown's reluctance is shared by lawmakers across
the country for a variety of possible reasons, ranging from
concern about constituent reaction to influence by organized
opposition groups. In fact, the same groups that once opposed
living will legislation have redoubled their efforts to fight
physician-aid-in-dying. 109 In addition, the pro-life groups that
once focused exclusively on opposing abortion rights have

108. Prepared testimony of Dr. John G. Westover, President, National Hemlock
Society, Iowa Legislative Hearing on Senate Bill 2066, at 2 (Feb. 25, 1992) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Other supporters of rightto-die legislation have been unwilling to sponsor bills relating to physician-aid-indying. Senator Barry Keene, noted for having pursued the first living will statute in
the nation, declined to include aid-in-dying language to a 1986 bill aimed at amending the 1976 California Natural Death Act. See GLICK, supra note 34, at 103.
Reportedly, Keene felt that any proposal that called for physician-aid-in-dying was
"too controversial and politically risky to stand any chance of getting through the
Legislature.• Parachini, supra note 15, at 10; see also supra note 75 (describing the
Florida Legislature's unwillingness to sponsor euthanasia legislation, despite its
sympathy for those involved in a recent mercy killing situation).
109. The primary opponent to living will legislation, the Catholic Church,
recently displayed its opposition to physician-aid-in-dying by seeking reversal of
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), a
decision upholding a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1995). The United States
Catholic Conference and four bishops from western states filed an amicus curiae
brief with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on July 11, 1994,
seeking reversal of the district court opinion. Bishops, Catholic Conference Fight
Court's Ruling on Assisted Suicide, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22, 1994, at E-5. On
March 9, 1995, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held Washington's
assisted-suicide law constitutional as applied to physicians aiding competent,
terminally-ill patients. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594. Catholic Conferences
have also joined as amici curiae for at least two other physician-aid-in-dying cases
brought before courts in this country. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 715
(Mich .. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995) (Michigan Catholic Conference);
Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (New York State Catholic
Conference); see also Judge Strikes Down Oregon Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1995, at A15 (describing the Catholic Church's legal opposition to Oregon's voterenacted physician-assisted suicide law).
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mobilized a campaign against euthanasia. no No doubt these
powerful interest groups have been successful in discouraging
lawmakers from supporting the controversial practice. of euthanasia, much as they initially discouraged support for
patients' rights to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
Even in light of visible opposition to physician-aid-iri-dying,
legislative inaction is still somewhat surprising given that .
public opinion favors giving patients the right to choose an
accelerated death. Polls taken within the past several years
consistently show at least sixty percent of those responding
favor allowing physicians to assist their dying patients who
choose to control the timing of their deaths. 111 For example, a
1992 article appearing in the Journal of the American Medical
Association stated that, based on polling, sixty-four percent of
Americans believed that physicians should be allowed by law
to respond to a patient's request for lethal drugs or injections
to aid dying if the patient is terminally ill, conscious, and in
pain. n 2 Perhaps this swell of public support has convinced
euthanasia advocates that the place to make real change is in

110. See, e.g., Roger Mahony, Ending Pain Shouldn't Mean Ending Liues, L.A.
TIMES, May 9, 1994, at B7 (opposing physician-aid-in-dying and writing that "Christians, in particular, believe that loving acceptance of suffering can lead to enormous
personal growth"). Cardinal Roger Mahony, the writer of this editorial, is archbishop
of Los Angeles and chairman of the United States Catholic Bishops' Committee for
Pro-Life Activities. Id.
111. For example, a 1990 Gallup Poll asked: "When a person has a disease that
cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's
life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it?" GLICK, supra
note 34, at 83. Sixty-nine percent of respondents answered affirmatively. Id. at 84.
A 1990 Roper Poll asked: "When a person has a painful and distressing terminal
disease, do you think doctors should or should not be allowed by law to end the
patient's life if there is no hope of recovery and the patient requests it?" Don C.
Shaw, Reflection, in QHOOSING DEATH: ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, RELIGION, AND THE PuBLIC
DEBATE 128, 129 (Ron P. Hamel ed., 1991). Sixty-four percent of the respondents said
"yes," 24% said "no," and 13% did not know. Id.
Polls taken during the statewide campaigns in Washington in 1991 and in California in 1992 also showed strong support for the concept (and presumably the practice)
of voluntary euthanasia, at least until the final days before the election. See infra
notes 182-84 and accompanying text; see also Schanker, supra note 79, at 980
(reporting that California voters favored Proposition 161 until just before the
election); Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, at Lll (analyzing
Washington voters' shift in views from favoring to opposing the initiative).
112. Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying?, 267
JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992). In addition to general polling, a group of researchers
recently conducted a poll of Washington state physicians' attitudes toward physicianaid-in-dying. See Cohen et al., supra note 18, at 89. The researchers found that 53%
of those physicians responding to a written survey thought that euthanasia should
be legal in some circumstances. Id. at 90.
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the voting booth and not through traditional legislative channels. In other words, even where public opinion would support
legislative efforts to legalize euthanasia, few such efforts have
gone forward. When efforts toward legalization have gone
forward, they generally have been met with opposing efforts.
In Michigan, for example, a state at the center of the euthanasia debate because of the actions of Dr. Kevorkian, legislation
has been introduced both favoring and banning physicianassisted aid-in-dying. 113 Despite, or perhaps because of, this
legislative activity, in 1994 euthanasia supporters in Michigan
began gathering voter signatures to place a physician-assisted
suicide constitutional amendment referendum on the November ballot. 114 In Colorado, a group called Colorado Citizens for
Peaceful Death is seeking passage of a law similar to Oregon's
Measure 16. 115
The recent flurry of grass-roots activity is likely a signal that
supporters of voluntary active euthanasia have resorted to
making positive law voter-by-voter, state-by-state. 116 Both
positive and negative forces have influenced the move toward
voter-made law. The principal negative force is the fact that
supporters have been essentially shunned by representative
lawmakers who sense opposition from constituents or influential lobby groups. 117 But supporters also have been motivated
by a sense that death choices, like life choices, are intensely
personal and should be made on an individual basis. 118 The

113. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
114". See Top Michigan Court, supra note 31, at A21. The-Michigan effort needed
256,741 signatures by July 11, 1994; as of June 8, 1994, more than half that number
had been collected. Id. In the en'd, however, supporters were unable to gather the
requisite signatures. See Kevorkian Referendum Drive Fails, Closes, CHI. TRIB., July
12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting that Dr.
Kevorkian's lawyer, Geoffrey Fieger, plans to finance personally the petition drive for
the 1996 ballot).
115. See Clifford D; May, Doctor-Assisted Death: Is Assisted Suicide a Right That
Should Be Available to Dying Individuals?, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 15, 1995, at 91A.
For a description of the California efforts, see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying
text.
116. One major shortcoming of this strategy is that voter lawmaking is available
in less than half of the states in this country, meaning that supporters must look to
the legislatures in the remaining states. For a more detailed discussion of this issue,
see infra Part III.A.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 75, 109.
118. See, e.g., Letter from Michael H. White, President, Death with Dignity, to the
author (Dec. 26, 1994) (soliciting funds for his group and emphasizing right to make
personal, individual choice in dying) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
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movement itself has survived because of the efforts of individual members who have strived to establish choice-in-dying for
themselves and others. 119 This quest for personal choice is
evident in both the practice and legalization ofphysician-aid-indying; in each instance, there is a perceived need for individual
participation.
In predicting the future strategies of euthanasia supporters,
one must analyze the recent events surrounding the enactment of the nation's first law authorizing physician-assisted
suicide. Although Oregon voters were able to pass, by a bare
majority, a statute assuring some choice in dying, a federal
court in that state has enjoined the statute's implementation.120 This judicial block certainly will give pause to supporters in other states who may perceive their organizing efforts
to be in vain if citizen approval does not assure a change in
current law. Perhaps the Oregon experience is best viewed as
a testing ground for voter-made law in this area. If the law
ultimately fails to pass constitutional muster, then direct
democracy ·becomes a toothless tiger in this respect. Under
those circumstances, supporters will likely shift their efforts
to gain judicial approval of some form of physician-aid-indying under current law. 121

C. Euthanasia and the Courts: A Model of
Erraticism and Ambivalence
Voluntary active euthanasia is illegal in every state in this
country. 122 Thus, doctors who cause the death of a patient, even
at the patient's request, can be prosecuted for homicide. 123

119. The principal founder of the National Hemlock Society, Derek Humphry,
describes the group's mission as follows: "Hemlock publishes newsletters and books,
holds conferences, conducts research, makes educational videos, and calls public
meetings, all with the intention ofraising consciousness about the right of terminally
ill persons to choose to die in a manner of their choice." HUMPHRY, supra note 33, at
180.
120.
121.

See supra note 20.
To some extent, this shift has already occurred as courts in three states have
considered constitutional challenges to bans on assisted suicide as they apply to
physicians and terminally ill patients. See infra note 135.
122. BARRY R FuRRow ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 323 (1991).
123. Generally, consent by the victim is not a defense in a criminal prosecution.
1 WAYNER. LAFAVE&AUSTINW. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.ll(a)(2d
ed. 1986).
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Moreover, physicians who assist in a patient's self-inflicted
death can be prosecuted for assisting in a suicide, a criminal
offense in thirty-one states. 124 Despite the apparent clarity of
the criminal law, in this century individuals who have engaged
in "mercy killing" 125 have seen our judicial system respond in
an erratic and ambivalent manner.
A review of ·"mercy killing" cases reveals that juries and
sentencing judges tend to be more lenient on defendants who
are physicians, regardless of whether they participated in the
death of a patient or a member of their own family. To date,
eleven physicians have faced criminal charges in connection
with the killing of a patient or family member, but none has
been imprisoned. 126 In contrast, several nonphysicians who

124. For a list of the state statutes that prohibit assisted suicide, see Schanker,
supra note 79, at 983 n.31.
125. The term "mercy killing" is often used interchangeably with the word "euthanasia." See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "mercy killing"
as "euthanasia [or) the affirmative act of bringing about immediate death allegedly
'in a painless way and generally administered by one who thinks that the dying person
wishes to die because of a terminal or hopeless disease or condition").
126. By the term "imprisoned," I am referring to serving time in prison following
conviction or plea in a matter relating to the killing of a patient or relative. Imprisonment can be contrasted with incarceration, in which a defendant will spend time
in jail awaiting the disposition of his case. Defendant physicians facing mercy killing
charges have been incarcerated. For example, Dr. Jack Kevorkian was twice jailed
on charges of violating Michigan's newly enacted assisted-suicide law. Judy Pasternak,
Kevorkian's Assisted-Suicide Trial Opens, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at A20. In both
instances, Dr. Kevorkian staged hunger strikes in protest of the ban on assisted
suicide. Id. In November 1993, during one of Dr. Kevorkian's hunger strikes in·jail,
Jack DeMoss, a Michigan attorney, posted a $2000 bond to release the physician and
end Kevorkian's supposedly "faked hunger strike." Kevorkian Faces Hearing, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Apr. 1, 1994, at A7. In April 1994, DeMoss filed a motion seeking to
revoke Kevorkian's bond, saying, "I want to see him back in jail because I think he
is a menace to society." Id.
For a discussion of the 11 cases of physician prosecution, see Schanker, s.upra note
79, at 986 n.41. In his article, Schanker describes the scenarios surrounding the
various physician mercy killing cases, including the first widely publicized case
involving Dr. Herman Sander, a New Hampshire general practitioner who injected
air into the vein of a comatose cancer patient sometime in 1949. Id. at 986. The jury
acquitted Dr. Sander after an outpouring of public support and denouncement from
religious groups. Id. Other cases include a 1973 case in which Dr. Vincent Montemarano, chief surgical resident at the Nassau County Medical Center in New York,
gave a 57-year-old throat cancer victim a fatal injection of potassium chloride and was
subsequently indicted for murder. Id. The jury deliberated for only 55 minutes before
returning a not guilty verdict. Id. Dr. Donald Caraccio, a Michigan physician, lethally
injected a comatose 74-year-old woman; he pleaded guilty to the murder and received
only five years probation with community service. Id. at 986 n.41. Cases that involve
physicians' family members include Dr. Harold Blazer, who killed his daughter, a
victim of cerebral spinal meningitis, in 1935 and was later acquitted at trial. Id.
Another physician/family member case involved Dr. Peter Rosier of Florida, who was
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participated in the death of a loved one have served time in
prison. 127 One such defendant, Roswell Gilbert, received national attention in 1985 when he shot his wife of fifty-one
years, who suffered from Alzheimer's disease and osteoporosis.128 Mr. Gilbert was convicted of premeditated murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment. 129 On August 2, 1990, Florida
Governor Bob Martinez pardoned Gilbert, who was then eightyone and in failing health. 130
In searching for a rationale to explain why physicians and
not family members who euthanize their loved ones are more
often acquitteq by juries or treated leniently by judges, one
might look to the public perception of physicians in our society.
Judges as well as juries may perceive that a physician's
participation in killing a suffering patient, whether family
member or stranger, is merely an extension of the doctor's
ability to abate suffering. Clearly doctors are trained to treat
illness for the purpose of ending suffering; when illness can no
longer be treated and yet suffering persists, some may find it
logical for doctors to be the appropriate agents in ending a
person's suffering, even if that means ending her life. Family
members, on the other hand, possess no specialized training
in medicine or caring for the dying; juries may be more comfortable with their roles as participants in the bedside vigil
than in the death of their loved one. 131
·

acquitted after a failed attempt to end the life of his cancer-stricken wife. See STANLEY
M. RoSENBLATT, MURDER OF MERcY: EllTHANASIA ON TRIAL 7-9 (1992) (Dr. Hosier's lawyer's

account of the events surrounding the physician's prosecution).
127. Between 1920 and 1985, 51 "mercy killing" cases were brought to trial in
criminal courts; out of those 51, 10 defendants were found guilty of criminal homicide
and imprisoned. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 33, at 219.
128. Poll on Mercy-Killing Supports Full Pardon, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1985, at C30
(reporting the results of statewide poll in Florida, favoring a pardon for Gilbert); Poll:
63% Favor Gilbert Pardon, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 12, 1985, at lA.
129. See Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Under
Florida law, Gilbert's conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years,
meaning that he would be 100 years old before being eligible for release. Id. The
appellate court affirmed Gilbert's conviction and, while showing sympathy for the
elderly prisoner, noted that Florida law allowed no distinctions in the sentencing of
different kinds of wrongdoers, whether they are hired gangsters or kill for love or
mercy. Id. at 1192. Any such distinctions, the court concluded, "must be decided by
the legislature and not by the judicial branch." Id.
130. See Man Who Shot Wife as a Mercy Killing Is Granted Clemency, N. Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1990, at All.
131. But see Norman J. Finkel et al., Right to Die, Euthanasia, and Community
Sentiment: Crossing the Public/ Private Boundary, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 495
(1993) (describing a study that found juries in mock euthanasia trials willing to
convict a defendant husband of first degree murder of his terminally ill wife only
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While it may be difficult to discern jury or even community
sentiment surrounding euthanasia, it is not difficult to see that
even the most compelling scenarios have failed to rally the
courts around the issue of voluntary euthanasia the way that
In re Quinlan 132 prompted court after court to consider withdrawal of treatment cases. In the ten years following Quinlan,
appellate courts in seventeen states issued decisions relating
to a patient's right to refuse or withdraw treatment, and since
then courts in thirteen other states have added to the jurisprudence of treatment withdrawal. 133 Moreover, in 1990, the
United States Supreme Court decided its first right-to-die
case. 134
In contrast, little jurisprudence exists on the issue of euthanasia, despite public interest over the issue and the individuals whose cases have come to the attention of judges. 135
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the lack of euthanasia jurisprudence comes from the court that upheld Roswell
Gilbert's first degree murder conviction. In affirming the trial
court's decision not to instruct the jury on euthanasia, the
·appellate court explained that "[t]he judge denied this

35.9% of the time); infra note 139 (discussing Dr. Quill's dismissal from all charges
by a jury in Rochester, New York).
132. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
133. For a list of all right-to-die cases, see 1 MEISEL, supra note 26, § 1. 7 tbl. 1-1.
134. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). For a discussion
of why Cruzan can rightfully be classified a "right-to-die" case, see Judith F. Daar,
A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's Professional Conscience,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1241 n.l (1993).
135. To date, courts in three states have ruled on the constitutionality of state
laws banning assisted suicide. In 1994, a federal judge in Washington held unconstitutional the state's ban on assisting a mentally competent adult to commit suicide.
Compassion in Dyingv. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Rothstein's
ruling, thereby upholding the validity of the Washington statute· as applied to
terminally ill patients and their physicians. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49
F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995). In Michigan, the
· state supreme court held that the United States Constitution does not prohibit the
state from imposing criminal penalties on an individual who assists another in
committing suicide. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 739 (Mich. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995). Finally, a federal judge in New York ruled that the
state's assisted suicide ban is constitutional insofar as the statute bars physicians
from assisting in their terminally ill patients' suicides. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp.
78, 85 (S.D.N. Y. 1994). Although these cases may serve as the springboard for further
judicial focus on the issue of assisted suicide, they cannot be said to signal judicial
interest in voluntary active euthanasia that includes physician participation, beyond
mere prescription, in a patient's death. For further discussion of Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, see infra text accompanying notes 200-18.

828

University of Michigan JoumaJ, of Law &form

[VOL. 28:4

instruction because there was no supporting evidence." 136 At
trial, however, Gilbert did testify as to his motive for killing
his wife, 137 evidence that reasonably could be considered
supportive of a defense based on euthanasia.
What Gilbert teaches is that, at present, courts are simply
unwilling-or perhaps, as the case suggests, unable-to consider killing to end suffering as anything but murder. With
this message reverberating across the country, doctors are
wise to heed the court's stern warning that any action taken
to accelerate 138 a patient's death, even iftaken at the patient's
request, will be met with the full force of the law. 139 What this
message says to euthanasia advocates is that changes in the
law will likely not come from the courts, which in the past
have been activists for patients' rights. 140 A strong indication
of the lack of judicial support came when the Supreme Court
of Michigan held that Dr. Kevorkian could be prosecuted for
a common-law felony for assisting two women in committing
suicide. 141 In People v. Kevorkian, the court held that, even
absent a specific statutory prohibition of assisted suicide, one
who participates in a suicide but has not done the final act
causing death may be prosecuted under the felony savings

136. Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
494 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1986). The defendant's requested instruction was to advise the
jury that euthanasia is defined as "[t]he act or practice of painlessly putting to death
persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy." Id.
137. Id. at 1187 (reporting that at trial Gilbert testified on direct examination:
"I've got to end her suffering, this can't go on.").
138. Our medicolegal jurisprudence holds that withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatment is permissive, even as it accelerates a patient's death. See, e.g.,
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (dismissing
murder charges against two physicians who followed a family's wishes and ordered
removal of patient's life-sustaining treatment).
139. See Gilbert, 487 So. 2d at 1192. But cf infra text accompanying notes 273-75
(discussing the percentage of physicians who have admitted to helping a terminal
patient die). Furthermore, in a ruling that could signal a modern trend, a grand jury
in Rochester, New York, declined to indict Dr. Timothy Quill for his role in helping
a leukemia patient commit suicide by drug overdose. See Lawrence K. Altman, Jury
Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1991, at 1. At a later hearing by the New York Board for Professional Medical
Conduct, convened to assess whether Dr. Quill's actions amounted to misconduct, the
board cleared the doctor of all charges, saying that his actions were "legal and
ethically appropriate." Doctor Who Aided Suicide Cleared of Misconduct, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1991, at A32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68 (describing how the Florida appellate courts prompted the Legislature to act in the patients' rights arena).
141. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 733 (Mich. 1994) (holding that the
conduct was prohibited despite the fact that the deaths occurred before the enactment
of Michigan's ban on assisted suicide), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
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clause. 142 Proponents of euthanasia have only to look at the
events in Michigan to see that their strength lies in the individuals who support their cause, not in government institutions unwilling to begin a dialogue on this topic.
Having met with disinterest, suspicion, and hostility, euthanasia supporters are beginning to turn away from traditional
paths to legal legitimization and are looking instead to convert
grass-roots support into state-by-state legalization. Whether
these efforts will be successful remains to be seen, but some
predictive value can be placed in a comparison of citizen
attempts to institute physician-aid-in-dying through direct and
representative democratic channels. A review of the goals and
realities of direct democracy reveals that initiatives may not
serve proponents of choice-in-dying any better than traditional
methods.

II. TRANSLATING POPULAR SUPPORT INTO LAW:
THE IMPERFECTIONS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Proponents of controversial causes face substantial challenges as they fight to convert an idea into enacted law.
Certainly advocates for legalized euthanasia have encountered
the reality of legislative roadblocks, despite popular support
for the notion of freedom of choice in dying. 143 As noted earlier,
euthanasia proponents in two states, Washington and California, have turned their uphill legislative battle into a campaign
waged as a voter initiative in a statewide election. 144 Although
both Washington Initiative 119, in 1991, and California Proposition 161, in 1992, failed to win a majority of voter support,
backers will likely continue to seek legalization at the voter
level. There are a variety of reasons for this strategy.

142. Id. at 739. The Michigan felony savings clause provides that "[a]ny person
who shall commit any indictable offense at the common law, for the punishment of
which no provision is expressly made by any statute of this state, shall be guilty of
a felony." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.505 (West 1991). The court held that
assisting in a suicide would have been an indictable offense at common law.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 738. On May 2, 1994, Dr. Kevorkian was tried and
acquitted of assisting in the suicide of Thomas Hyde. See Judy Pasternak, Kevorkian
Is Acquitted for Role in Suicide, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at Al, Al 7. The charges in
the Hyde case were brought under Michigan's assisted-suicide ban, enacted in
February 1993. Id. at Al.
143. See supra note 111.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
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The most likely and logical explanation for continued focus
on the ballot process is the perceived voter support, and concomitant legislative nonsupport, for the concept of voluntary
euthanasia. Euthanasia advocates might also subscribe to the
claim of other champions of populist democracy that votermade lawmaking is inherently more beneficial to a reform
movement than its representative counterpart. The espoused
benefits of direct democracy include the following: (1) direct
legislation promotes government responsiveness and accountability-the people will have an alternative path to lawmaking
if lawmakers refuse to follow their wishes; (2) the initiative
process is less dominated by special interest groups; (3) voter
lawmaking produces open, educational debate on critical issues; (4) direct democracy interests voters, thereby increasing
election day turnout; and (5) voter initiatives are needed
because legislators often evade difficult issues, instead opting
for a low-risk, status quo position that helps them stay in
office. 145
These perceived benefits of direct democracy are best understood in a historical light. A brief look at the history and
development of the voter initiative reveals that the lofty goals
set out by turn-of-the-century reformers may not be realistic
today. 146 Moreover, contemporary legal and political scholars
are divided on whether direct legislation offers any advantages
· over legislative lawmaking. 147 Once the interworkings of our
current initiative process are examined, one can better analyze
the role that direct democracy has and can play in the bioethics
arena.

145. See CRONIN, supra note 6, at 10-11. Professor Cronin also summarizes the
criticism of direct democracy. Id. at 11. He writes that direct democracy opponents
have less faith in the ordinary citizen, thinking that she is not capable of making
sound judgments about complex matters and that, instead, she will be influenced by
television advertisements and bumper sticker messages, thus playing into the hands
of high-spending special interests. Id. For a thorough analysis of the benefits and
burdens of direct democracy, see generally MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 181-88
(contrasting the different ends and values of direct and indirect forms of democracy).
146. See infra Part II.A.
147. See infra Part 11.B.
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A. The History of Direct Democracy: Liberating Government
from Internal and External Corruption
The debate over the role of citizen lawmaking in the United
States traces its roots back· to the founding of the nation.
Americans of the Revolutionary era faced myriad challenges
in translating an array of strongly held beliefs about the role
and power of government into a workable design that would
win approval from amajorityofcitizens. 148 James Madison was
a central participant in this exercise. In his writings, Madison
showed a strong preference for limiting direct public participation in national politics, writing in The Federalist No. 10 that
"the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. "149 Concerned about overriding or ignoring those outside
the mainstream, Madison warned that, "[i]f a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
. insecure." 150
' Despite Madison's reservations about direct democracy, 151
citizen lawmaking, albeit in limited form, persisted in the
United States throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. 152 Though the Constitution did not provide for direct

148. There is a vast literature about the political debates that surrounded our
nation's founding, including the words of those who actually shaped our governmental
institutions. For a discussion of the issues and figures prominent in the debate about
direct democracy, see CRONIN, supra note 6, at 7-37. See also Eule, supra note 8, at
1522-30 (discussing the Framers' distrust of majority will).
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
151. Madison's reservations about direct democracy inspired some structural
checks against majority rule, including: ensuring that the House of Representatives
was the only directly elected body, as the Senate and President were originally
elected indirectly by intermediate bodies; and omitting from the Constitution any
provision for direct legislative decision making by the voters. See Jon E. Goetz, Direct
Democracy in Land Use Planning: The State Response to Eastlake, 19 PAC. L.J. 793,
807 (1987),
152. See CRONIN, supra note 6, at 41-42. Professor Cronin argues that "[d]irect
legislation expressing the 'will of the people' has had a certain legitimacy in America
since the 1640s, when all or most of the freemen in New England villages assembled
to make the laws by which they would be regulated." Id. at ·4i. Notions of popular
government or self-government likewise animated New England town meetings in
which the populace promulgated new policies and repealed ill-advised ones. Id.; see
also LAURA TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL PROCESS 10 (1977) (discussing the presence of direct
democracy in America since 1638).
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voter lawmaking, individual states adopted mechanisms for
citizen participation in the enactment of state law. For example, Massachusetts allowed its citizens to vote on a new state
constitution in 1778, 153 and by 1831 nearly every state entering the union submitted their constitutions to popular vote. 154
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, states
increasingly abandoned methods of direct citizen lawmaking
and relied on more representative forms of government. 155
Interest in direct democracy resurged with the Progressive
movement of the early twentieth century. 156 At that time, the
country was experiencing massive industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. Citizen distrust of representative
democracy was on the rise as special corporate interest groups
and political party bosses began to wield increasing influence
in government. 157 The Progressives promoted direct democracy
as a way of neutralizing these corrupting forces while at the
same time restoring more power to the people. 158 They touted
the initiative, referendum, and recall as ways ofliberating the
legislative process from internal and external corruption by
bringing the people directly into lawmaking. 159 Moreover,
Progressives believed that direct democracy would serve an

153. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 35.
154. See id.; see also CRONIN, supra note 6, at 41 (noting that, by the end of the
nineteenth century, all but a handful of states had constitutions that had been
approved by popular referendum).
155. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 35.
156. Id.
157. In California, for example, the Southern Pacific Railroad entered the 1900s
with its economic and political power unchallenged. See id. at 37. The corporation had
developed a strong affiliation with the state's ruling Republican Party and was labeled
the "octopus" in Frank Norris's book of the same name. See id. at 37 & n.17. Norris
described the Southern Pacific Railroad as controlling even the ballot box. Id.
158. See CRONIN, supra note 6, at 54-56 ("Progressives were ... concerned that
state legislatures were not functioning as they should. Their proceedings involved too
much secrecy, too little discussion, too much automatic passage of what legislative
committees proposed.").
159. Id. at 56. One scholar analogizes the political reforms of the early twentieth
century to coinciding economic reforms as follows:
Much as antitrust law was designed to break the economic power of these
combinations and restore free competition, the initiative, with the allied reforms
of the direct primary, the popular election of Senators, the referendum, and the
recall, was intended to break the stranglehold these combinations had on the
political process by bringing the people directly into lawmaking.
Briffault, supra note 11, at 1348 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM
BRYAN TO F.D.R. 254-69 (1961)). For distinctions between initiative, referendum, and
recall, see CRONIN, supra note 6, at 2.
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educational and social function, prompting discussion and
debate among citizen lawmakers. 160
In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to adopt direct
democracy in the form of the initiative and referendum. 161 Over
the next twenty years, twenty-one additional states joined in
adopting some form of direct voter lawmaking. 162 To date,
twenty-six states authorize voters to initiate legislation or to
demand the referral of legislative enactments for approval or
rejection. 163 Of these twenty-six, twenty-one states have initiative provisions, allowing citizens to circulate and enact ordinary legislation by placing an initiative on the ballot. 164

160. Briffault, supra note 11, at 1348. Professor Briffault points out that "[elven
today, proponents of the initiative, who range across the ideological spectrum from
Jack Kemp to Ralph Nader, assert that direct democracy can liberate politics from
special interest groups, re~uce voter malaise, and energize the electorate." Id. at
1348-49.
161. See CRONIN, supra note 6, at 51 tbl. 3.1.
162. Id. Between 1898 and 1918, the 22 states adopting either both initiative and
referendum or just referendum were (in order of adoption): South Dakota (1898); Utah
(1900); Oregon (1902); Nevada (referendum only, 1904; adopted initiative lawmaking
in 1912); Montana (1906); Oklahoma (1907); Maine, Missouri (1908); Arkansas,
Colorado (1910); Arizona, California (1911); New Mexico (referendum only, 1911);
Idaho, Nebraska, Ohio, Washington (1912); Michigan (1913); North Dakota (1914);
Kentucky(referendumonly, 1915), Maryland (referendum only, 1915); and Massachusetts (1918). Id.
163. See id. In addition to the 22 states cited in supra note 162, the four states
that have authorized direct democracy since 1918 are Alaska (1959); Florida (initiation
of state constitutional amendments only, 1968); Wyoming (1968); and Illinois
(initiation of state constitutional amendments only, 1970). Id. In 1970, the District
of Columbia adopted lawmaking through voter initiative and popular referendum. Id.
164. See Eule, supra note 8, at 1509 n.22. The 21 states that permit citizens to
initiate and enact legislation are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
Id. The five remaining states that permit some form of direct democracy are Kentucky,
Maryland, and New Mexico (referendum only); and Florida and Illinois (constitutional
initiative only). Id.
In general, a direct initiative "may be placed on the ballot by securing a specified
number of signatures-usually set at some percentage of the votes cast in the preceding general election." Id. at 1510. Thereafter, the measure is enacted if it attracts a
majority of votes. Id. For a listing of the specific requirements for qualification and
approval of statewide statutory initiatives, see MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 38 tbl. 3.1.
See also DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 130 tbl. 4.1 (providing state-by-state
initiative qualification requirements). In California, for example, as of 1992, initiative
proponents must obtain 384,971 valid signatures (five percent of the vote in the
preceding gubernatorial election) to place a statutory initiative on the ballot and
615,953 signatures (eight percent of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial election)
to place a constitutional initiative on the ballot. Id. at 6.
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Until the 1970s, voter use of the initiative varied among
states, but overall initiative activity was relatively insignificant.165 Yet, perhaps because of the influences of the·
Vietnam War, Watergate, urban rioting, or a general distrust
of government, the 1970s ushered in a new era of voter activism
in the form of ballot initiatives. In California, for example, the
number of initiatives qualifying for the ballot rose from nine
in the 1960s, to twenty-two in the 1970s, to forty-six in the
1980s; the number is estimated to reach approximately seventyfive to one hundred in the 1990s. 166 In the general election of
1990, initiative proponents across the country succeeded in
putting at least sixty-seven proposals on statewide ballots, the
largest number since 1932. 167
With the increased use of the initiative came increased
concerns about its use. Scholars, politicians, and voters themselves began to question whether the initiative process was
truly an antidote to corrupt government or simply another
route for special interest groups to curry favor with uninformed
and gullible decision makers. 168 Additionally, concerns surfaced
about the problem of "the tyranny of the majority," in which
majoritarian voters exclude or discriminate against those with

165. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 54. In California, between 1912
(the first year initiative voting was permitted) and 1968, voters qualified 138 measures
for the ballot, with only 10 and 9 qualifying during the 1950s and 1960s, respectively.
Id.
166. Id. at 55 tbl. 2.1.
167. Robert Pear, Number of Ballot Initiatives Is the Greatest Since 1932, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at BlO. David Magleby, professor of political science at Brigham
Young University has postulated that
[t]he initiative process was rediscovered by single-issue groups in the mid-1970's,
and its use has been growing since then. People found it was a vecy effective way
to set the political agenda, regardless of whether they won or lost on Election
Day. The initiative process is among the most powerful agenda-setting tools in
our democracy.

Id. Magleby is the author of Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the
United States, cited earlier in this Article. See MAGLEBY, supra note 11.
168. See, e.g., John Garamendi, California's Ballot Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1990, at A15 (criticizing the state's initiative process, which Garamendi claims
"renders [California] citizens especially susceptible to the electronic and computerized
campaign tactics of those in the business of promoting initiatives, which allows the
special interests to profit"); Herb ·Robinson, Some Problems with Voter Initiatives,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 1990, at A12 (complaining that initiative campaigns are about
"big bucks being raised, influential endorsements on each side, and posturing by
political incumbents"). For a summary of scholarly criticism of direct democracy, see
infra notes 170-72.
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minority views. 169 These criticisms, as wen· as the empirical
data gathered in their support, help to set the stage for an
analysis of citizen lawmaking as it relates to a specific focus
of this Article: physician-aid-in-dying.

B. Ballot Initiatives: Lawmaking by the People, for the
People, or Through the People?
Contemporary scholars have identified several aspects of
direct democracy that arguably reveal that the lofty goals of
increased voter participation in government and decreased
special interest influence have not been met. 170 Areas of
critique include the following: (1) the question of voter
competency-critics argue that voters are not informed or
thoughtful enough to vote on complicated public policy issues; 171 (2) concerns about subordination or destruction of
minority rights-scholars worry that direct democracy fosters
a tyranny of the majority,. diminishing the rights and liberties
of the politically powerless; and (3) the role of money in direct
democracy campaigns--empirical studies of initiatives arguably show that spending patterns on ballot initiatives correspond to the success of the bigger spender, raising questions
about the impact that special interest groups continue to have
on the political process. 172
169. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 11, at 28 (arguing that referenda demonstrate
discrimination and prejudice when "the issue submitted to the voters suggests, even
subtly, that majority interests can be furthered by the sacrifice of minority rights.")
170. One author summarizes her criticisms as follows: "[D]irect democracy is
plagued by voter ignorance, voter apathy, and procedural defects, results in laws
which impede minority rights, is inefficient, and has a deleterious effect on the
branches of government:" Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by lnitiatiue, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 733, 737 (1988).
171. This criticism actually speaks to two concerns about voter competency: the
problem of voters' understanding of the issues and the statutory responses contained
in the initiative and the problem of "drop-off," or diminished voter participation in
ballot questions compared to voting for candidates on the same ballot.
172. I believe these to be the major criticisms of direct democracy. Numerous
other criticisms have been expressed, many of which are derivative of these central
concerns. They include: (1) the complexity of ballot measures prevents assessment of
an issue's intricacies; (2) there is a lack of informative communication and a surplus
of slanted political advertising in the process; (3) the process suffers from numerous
procedural defects, including: a lack of pre-enactment review to detect internal
inconsistencies, conflicts with existing law, or questionable policy bases; and a lack
of signature gathering integrity, through which signatures are obtained through
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In addition to concerns about the vitality and malleability of
voters, critics highlight the structural shortcomings of the
initiative process. For example, once a ballot proposition has
been authorized for signature gathering, it only rarely can be
amended. 173 This often leaves voters with the choice of accepting or rejecting the proposed language with no opportunity to
suggest improvements or clarification. The initiative process
in most states also does not provide for public hearings prior

misrepresentation of the substance of the ballot measure; (4) direct democracy
discourages compromise by setting up barriers to amending ballot proposals, leaving
no place for negotiation and bargaining; (5) ballot initiatives result in inefficiency by
encouraging lavish spending on campaigns, forcing state governments to incur
substantial costs to verify signatures and conduct elections, arid often leading to
expensive litigation over the constitutionality of newly enacted measures; (6) direct
democracy diminishes legislative responsibility because legislators are tempted to
leave controversial issues to a popular vote; and (7) voter-generated statutes place
a greater burden on the judiciary, who may be asked to interpret such laws without
the benefit oflegislative history. See Fountaine, supra note 170, at 739, 741, 742-47,
751-58. For other critiques of direct c:J,emocracy, see generally DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 64-70 (listing 11 criticisms of the California initiative
process, including charges that it "[e]ncourages single-issue politicsn and "[u]ndermines political partiesn); MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 196-99 (summarizing key issues
in any discussion of the initiative process); Goetz, supra note 151, at 814-22
(discussing four "major deficienciesn of the initiative).
In addition to the specific indictments against the workings of the initiative
process, numerous scholars have questioned the constitutionality of direct democracy,
arguing that direct democracy violates the United States Constitution's guarantee of
a republican form of government. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR.
L. REV. 19, 25-30 (1993); Fountaine, supra note 170, at 759-65; Douglas H. Hsiao,
Note, Invisible Cities: The Constitutional Status of Direct Democracy in a Democratic
Republic, 41 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1290-1310 (1992). The Constitution provides that "[t)he
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government.n U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4. This clause, known as the Guaranty Clause,
obligates each state to govern itself by republican institutions. See THE FEDERALIST No.
43 (James Madison). By delegating the power to enact law to the people, states may
have abdicated their responsibility to provide a republican, or representative, form
of government. The details and debate surrounding this argument are highly
important to the vitality of direct democracy but are beyond the scope of this Article,
which assumes, per state and federal high court decisions, the constitutionality of the
initiative process. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668,
679 (1976) (upholding a mandatory referendum ordinance and holding that power of
initiative and referendum is reserved by the people, not redelegated by the legislature).
173. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 79-80. Pre-circulation
amendability varies from state to state. Some states require review of all initiatives prior
to circulation for compliance with the single-subject rule (limiting the content of an
initiative to a single subject); others require review by specified election officers to make
recommendations concerning the form and substance of the proposal. Id. at 99-109. Postenactment amendability is also problematic in some states; in California, for example,
a law enacted by initiative can only be amended by another ballot measure, unless the
law itself allows for subsequent legislative amendments. Id. at 80.
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to petition circulation. 174 This lack of opportunity for public
input seems contrary to the notion of direct democracy as a
vehicle for popular lawmaking. Taken together, the problems
with lack of amendability and opportunity for pre-circulation
public debate stand in stark contrast to legislative lawmaking
which, at least theoretically, invites public oversight at nearly
every turn.
These concerns, among others, leave many doubting that
direct democracy provides any advantages over its representative counterpart in terms of voter independence and empowerment.175 An examination of these concerns, both generally and
as they affected the campaigns surrounding the euthanasia
initiatives in Washington and California, shows that the shortcomings of lawmaking through direct democracy are no fewer
than those surrounding representative lawmaking. In the end,
the initiative process is probably better suited to serve as an
impetus for legislative lawmaking rather than as a replacement of it.
1. The Question of Voter Competency: Concerns About Information, Understanding, and Deliberation-Questions about
what voters think, hear, and process have captivated political
strategists for generations. 176 Many have expressed skepticism
over an ordinary citizen's ability to comprehend intricate
statutory language compared to the comprehension level of a
"trained" legislator. 177 After all, voters are not engaged in the
business of lawmaking as are full-time legislators who, ideally, spend their working lives analyzing and debating political
questions. To this end, I would argue that two phenomena
play a role in diminishing this perceived inequality between
voters and legislators. First, every state with an initiative
system provides for the distribution of voter information,

174. See id. at 102. One state, Colorado, allows for a public hearing on an initiative
before signatures are collected. Id. Initiative proponents thereby receive criticisms
and advice from the public and not merely from governmental sources. Id. As a result,
roughly 70% to 80% of original initiative drafts are revised by the proponents. Id.
175. See supra note 172.
176. See, e.g., ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 4-17 (1960) (outlining
the first presidential election voting behavior survey, conducted from 1948 to 1956).
177. See, e.g., Fountaine, supra note 170, at 740 (describing a study that found
that the level of education required to understand California ballot pamphlets varied
from two years of college to two years of graduate school but that the average voter
had completed only 13 years of school); see also MAGLEBY, supra note 11, at 118-19
(discussing the readability of ballot titles and descriptions).
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including a caption and summary of all proposed measures. 178
Information disseminated to voters through such mechanisms
as ballot pamphlets and newspaper descriptions offers voters
an objective, simplified discussion of the proposed law. 179 In a
recent study on the issue of voter ability to understand ballot
measures, one ,author came to the following conclusion: "Experience in the states suggests that on most issues, especially
well-publicized ones, voters do grasp the meaning of the issue
on which they are asked to vote, and that they act competently."180
Second, perhaps as a counterbalance, I would argue that our
elected lawmakers are often not well-versed in the details of
much legislation, particularly when they must vote on large
numbers of bills in order to meet an impending deadline. 181 I
do not mean to argue that voters are better or even equally
informed about the particulars of legislation compared to
elected lawmakers: my conclusion is that, on a given election
day, voters may be as informed about one or several ballot
propositions that have been the subject of written and verbal .
debate as a legislator is on any given voting session· day.
How do these assessments fare in the context of the euthanasia campaigns in California and Washington? Perhaps the
best indication of voter information intake and understanding
can be found in the exit polls that asked voters why they voted
as they did. In California, where Proposition 161 was defeated
despite early polls indicating relatively high levels of support, 182 voters indicated that the major reason they opposed

178. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 228; see also id. at 231 tbl. 7.2
(setting out a chart of state provisions for official ballot captions and summaries).
179. See id. at 235-36. "Fourteen states, including California, distribute a ballot
pamphlet to voters. Fourteen states purchase pages in major newspapers to print
official descriptions of initiatives. Five states use both methods." Id. at 235. It is
important to note that the responsibility for drafting ballot captions, summaries, and
descriptions generally rests with a state official, such as the Attorney General or
Secretary of State. See id. at 230. For a list of each state's official responsible for
drafting ballot captions and summaries, see id. at 231.
180. CRONIN, supra note 6, at 87.
181. See, e.g., Daniel M. Weintraub, Legislators Throw out the Textbook in LastMinute Frenzy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1989, pt. I, at 3 ("Meeting late into the night,
the Senate and Assembly pass bills by the bushel, most of which are never read by
the members.").
182. Alexander M. Capron, Euen in Defeat, Proposition 161 Sounds a Warning,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 32, 32 ("Surveys taken in March and April
[of 1992] showed that 75 percent of California voters favored the basic concept of
physician-aid-in-dying, 54 percent strongly so."). According to a Los Angeles Times poll
conducted approximately a week before the November 3, 1992 election, 49% of
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this particular initiative was because it lacked sufficient safeguards against abuse. 183 In Washington, Initiative 119 suffered
a similar experience. 184 This uniform response indicates either
that voters were swayed by negative campaigning focusing on
the "inadequate safeguards" argument or that voters were
informed enough about the issue to make a reasoned judgment
as to their personal prefe.rence for this piece of legislation, or
both. In other words, Proposition 161 and Initiative 119
garnered voter response that showed a relatively high level of
voter comprehension: voters seemed to be informed about the
substance, and to some extent the specifics, of the proposed
legislation.
The political experience surrounding the euthanasia initiatives, at least with respect to voter competency, stands out as
a positive tally for combining direct democracy and bioethical
choices. If voters perceive that they will be given the opportunity to express their own personal, moral beliefs about a practice that may very well touch their own lives, they are likely
to become informed about the choices they are asked to make.
Bioethical choices, such as decisions about abortion and the
right to die-unlike choices often posed in initiatives such as
taxation, environmental controls, or land use planning185--call
upon voters to consider issues that they likely have contemplated already in their lives. I would surmise that few voters
contemplated their response to physician-aid-in-dying for the

California voters favored Proposition 161, 45% opposed it, and 6% were undecided.
George Skelton, Voters Euenly Split Ouer Proposal to Cut Welfare, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
27, 1992, at Al, Al8.
183. See Capron, supra note 182, at 32 ("Among those who voted against [Proposition 161], 43 percent told exit-pollsters that inadequate safeguards was the primary
reason for their opposition."). Proposition 161 provided that a patient could make a
written request to a doctor to end her life, followed by an oral request at the time the
patient decided she wanted to die. Death with Dignity Act, supra note 16, §§ 2525.3,
2525. 7. One of the allegedly inadequate safeguards was that an independent witness
did not have to sign a patient's written request for aid-in-dying or be present during
an oral request. See Miller, supra note 2.
184. Polls preceding the November 5, 1991 vote showed that 61% of Washington
residents favored Initiative 119. Andrew M. Jacobs, The Right to Die Movement in
Washington: Rhetoric and the Creation of Rights, 36 How. L.J. 187, 209 (1993).
Opponents asserted that Initiative 119 had no safeguards and could, for example, lead
to euthanizing of the depressed. Id. Apparently the "no safeguards" tactic worked, as
both the Seattle Times and Initiative 119 campaign chair Karen Cooper credited this
argument for the defeat of Initiative 119. Id. at 205.
185. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 60 tbl. 2.5 (setting out the
subject matters of California initiatives from 1912 to 1990).
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first time on or just before election day. 186 Unlike intricate tax
schemes or complicated plans to regulate toxic emissions, ballot
questions about personal medical decisions are generally quite
simple, asking the voter: "Do you want the government to
regulate your decision making in this area in this way?" 187
One's response to this question necessarily invokes longstanding and deeply held beliefs and values that guide one's
personal decision making on a day-to-day basis.
Accepting, arguendo, this high level of voter interest and
knowledge about bioethical ballot measures, one might also
expect a high amount of voter discussion and deliberation
about these particular measures. Such a result would be exactly what the proponents of direct democracy envisioned-an
informed, participatory electorate debating the pros and cons
of various statutory suggestions. 188 Critics of direct democracy
suggest that inter-voter deliberation of ballot propositions is
low, even nonexistent at times. 189 Newspaper accounts of the
activity surrounding both Proposition 161 and Initiative 119,
however, show a fairly high level of community debate and
citizen deliberation. 19° For example, both initiatives were the
subject of sermons and group discussion in churches across the
states; 191 they were also the focus of numerous radio, television,
and newspaper advertisements and commentaries. 192
186. One poll reported that, in Washington, 63% of voters said that they made up
their minds on aid-in-dying at least a month before casting their ballots, when public
debate began to intensify. Jack Broom & Susan Gilmore, Morality, Freedom of Choice
Clash in Decisions on 119, 120, SEATl'LE TIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at Dl.
187. Admittedly this is a gross oversimplification of the substance of previous
initiatives, but it serves to illustrate the distinction between ballot bioethical choices
and choices about other social and economic issues, which tend not to implicate
directly an individual's bodily integrity or personal autonomy.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
189. See CRONIN, supra note 6, at 70-77.
190. See, e.g., Susan Gilmore, Will Foes' Efforts Doom California's Euthanasia
Bill?, SEATl'LE TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, atA14 (reporting that 135 groups joined to oppose
Proposition 161, which, like Initiative 119, had touched off much debate); Paul Jacobs,
Initiative Fuels Debate Over Morality ofEuthanasia, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at A20
(detailing that university bioethicists were in high demand to speak on Proposition
161).
191. Seattle's Archbishop Thomas Murphy argued against Initiative 119 during
a Catholic mass. Charles E. Brown, Initiatives 119, 120 Denounced in Mass by
Archbishop Murphy, SEATl'LE TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at E 1. In California, Cardinal Roger
Mahony expressed opposition to Proposition 161 by writing a letter to be read at all
masses in Los Angeles, Ventura, and Santa Barbara counties on the Sunday before
election day. Jacobs, supra note 190, at A20.
192. For example, Proposition 161 and Initiative 119 were the subject of over 180
newspaper editorials during and after the campaigns. Search of LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws & Arcnws Files (Aug. 18, 1995).
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Although this kind of media and popular attention may not
be completely unique to the euthanasia initiatives, 193 what was
unique about the campaigns surrounding Initiative 119 and
Proposition 161 was the personal nature of the ·material
disseminated and discussed. 194 The issue caused voters to
reflect on their own experiences, desires, and expectations
surrounding the deeply personal issue of death. It was this selfreflection, this high degree of intimacy, that separated the
bioethical ballot measures from their traditional counterparts.
At the same time, lawmaking by citizens alone allows a majority of the voting public to dictate the range of personal choices
available to all citizens. In Washington and California, a bare
majority of voters were essentially able to deny to all residents
the right to choose physician-aid-in-dying.
This example of majoritarian rule is quite problematic with
regard to laws affecting personal decision making. By definition, decisions about self-determination should be made on an
individual, not a collective, basis. While this critique could be
applied to lawmaking in this area in general, it is particularly
troubling to realize that friends, neighbors, and strangers can
impose their values on an entire jurisdiction simply by voting
their preference. Unlike legislators, who can be held accountable for their decisions by their constituents, voters are not
motivated to learn and consider the variety of views held on
a ballot subject. Thus, despite an apparently high level of voter
interest and comprehension surrounding the euthanasia initiatives, the problem of the tyranny of the majority, discussed below, may militate against pursuing bioethical choices through
direct democracy.
2. Euthanasia and the Tyranny ofthe Majority-Initiatives
and referenda have been criticized for jeopardizing and subordinating minority rights by empowering a majority block of
193. The amount of money spent to support and oppose Proposition 161, see infra
note 241, pales in comparison with the monies spent in connection with numerous
other initiatives, including the 1988 California insurance initiative, Proposition 104
($37.5 million), and the 1990 California alcohol tax initiative, Proposition 134 ($24.2
million), DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 266. Despite this spending gap, the
California euthanasia measure seemed to garner more newspaper attention, though
other initiatives have also attracted attention. Nearly 60 editorials focusing on
Proposition 161 appeared in newspapers across the country, compared to just over 20
for Proposition 104, the insurance initiative. Search of LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
& Arcnws Files (Aug. 18, 1995).
194. See, e.g., Paul Jacobs, Enwtions Run High Over Doctor·Aided Death Issue, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at Al, A24 (reporting personal stories of terminally ill patients
and their views toward Proposition 161).
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voters to ignore or trample the rights of those holding fewer
votes. Tyranny of the majority in the voting booth, then, is a
concept that can be viewed in at least two ways. First,
majoritarian domination means that groups constituting a
majority in society, such as whites or heterosexuals, can pool
their supernumerary votes and enact legislation adversely
affecting those in the minority, such as blacks or gays. 195
Alternatively, one can view majoritarian voting as simply the
result of a democratic process in which the candidate or ballot
measure with the most votes prevails. In either case, voting in
our society inevitably pits some type of majority against a
nonprevailing minority.
Voter lawmaking about bioethical choices tends to invoke
concerns over the latter view ofmajoritarianism. With respect
to the euthanasia ballot initiatives, it does not appear that the
substance of the proposals themselves are aimed at, or even
disparately impact, any particular minority group. The population most affected by the legislation would be the terminally
ill and their families, a group that is as representative of our
nation's population as any. Illness and death are human
conditions, irrelevant to a person's race, ethnicity, or sexual
orientation. Unlike initiatives that single out distinct minorities, explicitly or implicitly, 196 the aid-in-dying measures would
not discriminate against any discrete minority group. 197
195. See Bell, supra note 11, at 14-15. ("Ironically, because it enables the voters'
racial beliefs and fears to be recorded and tabulated in their pure form, the referendum has been a most effective facilitator of that bias, discrimination, and prejudice
which has marred American democracy from its earliest day."). As an example,
Professor Bell points out that, between 1963 and 1968, 10 cities and the State of
California conducted open housing referenda, all initiated by fair housing opponents.
Id. at 15 n.54. All but one were enacted. Id.
With respect to gay rights, one need only glance at the political scene today to see
attempts by majoritarian heterosexuals to limit or destroy civil rights for homosexuals. For example, citizens in 10 states attempted to place on the November 1994
ballots initiatives that would ban civil rights protection for homosexuals. Brad
Knickerbocker, Gay-Rights Advocates Step Up Campaign, CHRlsTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
12, 1994, at 3. The petition drives were successful in two states, Oregon and Idaho.
Id.
196. An example of a constitutional proposition that explicitly singled out a
minority group was Amendment 2, the Colorado measure approved by voters that bars
local governments from prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. See
supra note 4. An example of an initiative that had an adverse impact on a minority
group but did not explicitly mention the group's distinguishing characteristic was
Proposition 14, in which California voters repealed the state's fair housing laws with
a constitutional amendment that barred any restriction on a property owner's
discretion to sell or lease to any person. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 370-71
(1967). The Supreme Court struck down the amendment, finding that through it the
state authorized and encouraged illegal racial discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 381.
197. I realize that there are those who disagree with this position and argue that
voluntary active euthanasia would be a discriminatory practice in that it would be
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The second view of majoritarianism described above, as a
means whereby a majority of voters can impose their views
upon a smaller group of voters, is, I believe, highly problematic
when the ballot issue is one involving medical decision making.
When voters are asked to enact a scheme that limits or enhances government regulation of a bodily function, their collective
decision may have an enormous impact on the way their fellow
citizens lead their lives. Sensitive to this important dynamic
relationship between regulation and personal decision making,
courts traditionally have been solicitous of the right to control
one's physical destiny.
The hallmark of our medicolegal jurisprudence has been the
centrality of personal autonomy and self-determination. The
Supreme Court confirmed these principles when it stated that
"a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment." 198 This
liberty interest, according to the Court, derives from the notion
of bodily integrity, which gives every adult the right to direct
what shall or shall not be done with his own body. 199
A similar interpretation of constitutionally protected liberty
interests informed the decision of Judge Rothstein in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 200 in which three terminally
used disproportionately "on" (as opposed to "by") those who are weak-physically,
socially, politically-such as the elderly, women, and racial or ethnic minorities. For
example, in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), Judge Noonan, writing for the majority, outlined
the state's interests in outlawing physician-assisted suicide, which included not
subjecting the elderly and the infirmed to "psychological pressure to consent to their
own deaths" as well as protecting the poor and minorities from exploitation based on
a desire to reduce the cost of public assistance. Id. One commentator has argued that
certain groups do perceive themselves to be at disparate risk if euthanasia is legalized,
citing results from the vote on Proposition 161 in which females opposed the measure
56%-44%, while males were split 50%-50%; whites opposed the measure 52%-48%,
while black and Hispanic voters opposed it 60%-40%. Capron, supra note 182, at 32.
198. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
199. Id. at 278, 272-73. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, spoke
of the notion of bodily integrity as an integral part of the common law doctrine of
informed consent, quoting the famous words of Justice Cardozo that "[e)very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body." Id. at 269 (quoting Schloendorffv. Society ofN.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,
93 (N.Y. 1914)). "The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent," Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that
is, to refuse treatment." Id. at 270. This same right to refuse medical treatment is
assumed to be a constitutionally protected liberty ip.terest later in the opinion. See
id. at 279.
200. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), reu'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995). Despite its current lack of precedential value,
I discuss the substance of Judge Rothstein's opinion because I believe that it provides
a logical and sensible framework for analyzing the legality of physician-aid-in-dying.
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ill patients and several physicians challenged the constitutionality of a Washington statute that makes it a felony to aid
knowingly another person in committing suicide. 201 Judge
Rothstein held that the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide. 202 Relying
on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 203 Judge Rothstein reiterated
long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence that personal
decision making involving intimate choices is a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. 204 According to the Court in Casey,
"'[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.' "205 Although the Court in Casey used
this language with regard to one's concept of how life begins,
Judge Rothstein found it applicable to decisions about the end
of life as well. Likening the decision of a terminally ill person
to commit suicide to that of a pregnant woman choosing to
have an abortion, Judge Rothstein held that both "'involv[e]
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime' and constitut[e] a 'choice[] central to personal
dignity and autonomy'" and are thereby embodied within the ·
liberty interest. 206 Thereafter Judge Rothstein adopted the
same standard of review applicable in Casey: in order to
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a state statute, plaintiffs had to show that it would "operate as a substantial
obstacle" to the exercise of a constitutional right and would
therefore constitute an "undue burden."207 Here, the court
concluded that the Washington statute "not only places a
substantial obstacle in the path of a terminally ill, mentally
competent person wishing to commit physician-assisted suicide,
but entirely prohibits it."208 The court held that such a total

201. 850 F. Supp. at 1156-59; see WASH. REV. CODE§ 9A.36.060 (1994) ("Aperson
is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide."). The plaintiffs challenged the statute only insofar as it
bans physician-assisted suicide by mentally competent, terminally ill adults who
knowingly and voluntarily choose to hasten their deaths. 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
202. 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
203. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
204. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
205. Id. (quoting 112 S. Ct. at 2807).
206. Id. at 1460 (quoting 112 S. Ct. at 2807).
207. Id. at 1462 (citing 112 S. Ct. at 2830).
208. Id. at 1465.
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ban unquestionably places an undue burden on the exercise of
a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 209
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Rothstein's
decision, with one judge dissenting; it thereby upheld the
validity of the state's assisted-suicide ban. 210 In short, the court
found that the lower court's reliance on Casey was "an unwarranted extension of abortion jurisprudence" which should be
limited to the reproductive context in which it was decided. 211
Moreover, the court held that the liberty interest in Casey did
not include the right to physician-assisted suicide because, if
it did, it could not legitimately be limited to terminally ill
persons. 212 Finally, the court spelled out several state interests
that outweigh any "alleged liberty of suicide,"213 including
protecting the integrity of the medical profession and guarding
against coercion of vulnerable populations such as the elderly
and handicapped. 214
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wright agreed with Judge
Rothstein that our nation's liberty jurisprudence includes the
right to choose physician-hastened death, just as it encompasses the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 215 Judge
Wright found that no constitutional distinction could be drawn
between a patient who seeks death via termination of a medical modality, such as a respirator, and one who seeks to end
unwanted agony but is not dependent on any artificial life
support. 216 Addressing the majority's concern about the limitlessness of the right to physician-assisted suicide ifthe statute
were held unconstitutional, Judge Wright stressed that the
statute was invalid only as it is applied to terminally ill,

209. Id. The court also relied on the principles set out in Cruzan v. Director,
. Missouri Department of Health. See id. at 1461. Noting that, in Cruzan, the Court
found that competent, terminally ill adults enjoy a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment, Judge Rothstein concluded that no
distinction could be drawn between refusing medical treatment to hasten death, and
seeking physician assistance for the same purpose. Id.
210. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
211. Id. at 591.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 592-93.
215. Id. at 597.
216. Id. at 595-96.
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mentally competent adults. 217 The Ninth Circuit has since
granted a rehearing en bane of this case. 218
The Rothstein/Wright approach to physician-aid-in-dying
legislation is both socially sensible and constitutionally sound.
Our medicolegal jurisprudence recognizes the right of every
adult patient to refuse medical care, even when such refusal
will lead to certain death. 219 Death is therefore among the
range of options available to patients whose lives are sustained
by mechanical means, such as respirators. But for those who
are not acutely dependent on machines to support their life
functions, the ability to choose death is severely circumscribed.
Likely the only treatment refusal that these patients can
choose is starvation. To force patients who choose death to
endure additional days or weeks of suffering2 20 seems inconsistent with the otherwise acknowledged right to choose death
by refusing treatment. 221
217. Id. at 595-97.
218. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
. 219. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
220. For example, Nancy Cruzan lived for 12 days after her feeding tube was
removed; her cause of death was listed as "shock, due to dehydration, due to severe
head injury." Robert Steinbrook, Comatose Woman Dies 12 Days After Life Support
Is Halted, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. The unfortunate scenario in which certain terminally ill patients are not able
to choose a swift and painless death through the exercise of a fundamental liberty
right raises the specter of unequal protection for similarly situated populations. In
her opinion, Judge Rothstein addressed the equal protection concerns of the plaintiffs.
Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1466-67.. Specifically, Judge Rothstein
considered the contention of the plaintiffs that the statute denied them equal
protection of the law because it distinguishes between two similarly situated groups
of mentally competent, terminally ill adults: those terminally ill patients attached to
life-sustaining equipment who, under current state law, could lawfully obtain medical
assistance in terminating such treatment and thus hasten death; and those terminally
ill patients who need no life-support systems, and who are therefore denied the option
of hastening death with medical assistance. Id. at 1466. The court found that these
two groups of patients were similarly situated and held that, by denying the latter
group of patients the equivalent option of exercising their rights to hasten their own
deaths with medical assistance, the statute violated the equal protection guarantee
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1467.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the lower court's equal protection rationale, finding that
the two groups of patients were not similarly situated because one group required that
action be taken to end life while the other depended on "actions by which life is not
supported or ceases to be supported." Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593. I fail to
see the difference between authorizing removal of a respirator and prescribing a lethal
dose of medication. Both involve action; both result in swift and painless death; and
both are done at the request of the patient or appropriate surrogate. Perhaps the court
worried that accepting the equal protection analysis in this instance would leave little
opportunity to deny its applicability to voluntary active euthanasia. If states were to
permit competent, terminally ill adults to hasten their death by ingesting a lawfully
prescribed overdose of medication, but did not permit competent, terminally ill adults
who lack the physical capacity to ingest medications to hasten their deaths with
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Although courts have, for now, rejected physician-assisted
suicide as a protected liberty interest, 222 none has rejected the
Supreme Court's pronouncement that some patients have a
fundamental right to choose death. 223 This right, like other
fundamental rights, cannot be abridged by state action absent
exceptional circumstances. 224 Given that the state, through its
legislature, cannot create laws that violate the liberty interests
of its citizens, neither can voters draft and enact such laws.
Although legal scholars have debated the standard of judicial
review that should be accorded citizen-made law, 225 courts
indisputably have the' power to strike down popular laws that
violate our Constitution. In the words of Chief Justice Burger,
"[i]t is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body
[enact a law], because the voters may no more violate the
Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative
body may do so by enacting legislation."226
Assuming that individuals have a liberty interest in their
choices about death and that citizens may not enact legislation
violating constitutional parameters, one can see how direct
democracy, as a way of setting policy about medical decision
making, can result in a majority of voters restricting the
liberties of a minority of voters, and perhaps of a majority of
citizens in the state. In California and Washington, when
voters rejected proposals for physician-aid-in-dying, they
medical assistance, then they would be creating a situation in which similarly situated
groups are receiving different treatment. Moreover, one's physical limitations, such
as muscle atrophy due to ametropic lateral sclerosis, should not be the barrier between
a lawful physician-assisted suicide, by drug ingestion, and an unlawful physicianassisted suicide, by drug injection. If, under a proposed assisted-suicide law, there
were no substantial differences between terminally ill patients who depend on
mechanical support to live and those who do not, then likewise there should not be
a distinction made between terminally ill patients who wish to end their lives through
prescription and those who require injection. Both require medical assistance; both
involve an intimate, personal decision arguably embodied in our constitutionally
protected liberty interest.
222. See supra note 31 (discussing the four decisions that have ruled on the issue).
223. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
224. According to our constitutional jurisprudence, once a fundamental right is
involved, a statute that limits that right can be justified only by a compelling state
interest and must be narrowly drawn to serve only that interest. See Compassion in
Dying, 49 F.3d at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting).
225. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 8, at 1508 (arguing that courts should bring more
scrutiny to voter-made law); Hsiao, supra note 172, at 1271 (disagreeing with Eule
and arguing that courts should declare voter-made law unconstitutional).
226. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981). Certainly the recent experience in Oregon demonstrates this
judicial willingness to strike down voter-made laws perceived to be unconstitutional.
See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995).
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imposed on the citizens of those states a regimen of nonchoice
in a most intimate part of their lives: death. This imposition
of the majority of the voters' will is no less tyrannical under
these circumstances than it is when voters decide to repeal
civil rights laws enacted for minority groups such as blacks or
gays. 227 In either case, larger voting pools are empowered to
withdraw or deny protected rights to some or all citizens within
the jurisdiction. 228
Of course, these two situations are not identical. In one
instance citizens vote to repeal existing rights, while in the
other voters refuse to enact legislation that would protect
certain rights. One may question how the refusal to enact
legislation can be considered tyranny of the majority. In the
euthanasia campaigns, where the right of patients to exercise
their self-determination by enlisting the voluntary assistance
of their physicians was at stake, the populace's actions
stayed, for now, a fledgling right that many predict will ultimately be incorporated into our medical jurisprudence. 229
Voters, therefore, are currently withholding a valued right
from their fellow citizens-a right that time will likely help
to mature into a legislated, protected choice. 230 Those living

227. See, e.g., supra note 196 (describing California Proposition 14, in which voters
repealed the state's fair housing laws, and Colorado's Amendment 2, which barred
local governments from prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation).
228. This argument assumes that the right to choose physician-aid-in-dying is a
protected right under our constitutional principles. See supra text accompanying notes
219-21.
229. Even the most vocal opponents of physician-aid-in-dying admit that the
current movement is likely to succeed in bringing legislative choices to dying
patients. For example, Professor Alexander Capron, who opposes voluntary active
euthanasia, writes:
Unless the health care providers who opposed Proposition 161 realize that its
showing at the polls is a clear public cry for help, akin to an individual's
suicide attempt, and unless they change those aspects of the system that make
a quick death such an attractive alternative, support for legalizing euthanasia
is sure to build and eventually to prevail.
Capron, supra note 182, at 33. For an indication of Professor Capron's views on
euthanasia, see Jacobs, supra note 190, at A20 (quoting Capron describing active
euthanasia as •'a statement of medical power, a clean medical solution to a problem, a statement of medical omnipotence and oinniscience,' n while• '[w]ithdrawal of
treatment is [merely] a recognition of the.limits to medicine' n).
230. There are other examples of rights being withheld by a majority of voters at
first, only later to be recognized as an important part of our constitutional jurisprudence. Prior to 1920, several states placed the question of female suffrage on the
ballot. CRONIN, supra note 6, at 97. Citizens in Missouri, Nebraska, and Ohio voted
against the measures. Id. In contrast, after several failed attempts in Colorado and
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and dying under the current system certainly have reason to
feel the oppression of majoritarianism.
Thus the question of the tyranny of the majority is not about
whether certain insular and protected groups will be adversely
affected by election outcomes but rather about whether an
emerging right will be denied to all because of the actions of
a majority of voters. When making bioethical choices, citizens
have enjoyed fairly broad protections from both legislatures
and courts. 231 But in the area of physician-aid-in-dying, legislative and judicial assistance has been slight, and proponents
have tried to turn generalized support into a statutory choice.
That statutory choice, proponents would argue, will allow each
individual to decide what is right for herself, so that no majority group of voters can veto or oblige an individual's choice-indying.
3. Lobbying at the Ballot Box: Direct Democracy and Campaign Spending-The grass-roots effort to attain statutory
validation for physician-aid-in-dying has been expensive for
proponents and opponents alike. Achieving change through
direct democracy requires expenditures that equal or exceed
those poured into lobbying efforts at the legislative level. 232
This is probably not what the pioneers of direct democracy
envisioned. In the early 1900s, when Progressives sought to
dilute the influence of well-financed special interests, they
likely envisioned a political process where voluntary and grassroots groups simply would circulate petitions, obtain the
requisite signatures, and inform potential voters about the
. merits of proposed ballot measures. 233 This vision has proven
to be highly unrealistic. Numerous studies conducted over the
past two decades show that money plays a significant, if not
decisive, role in direct democracy. 234 Money is used both to gain

Oregon, and relatively quickly in Arizona, voters granted the vote to women
through initiative petitions years before the United States Constitution was amended to permit women's suffrage. See id.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
232. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
233. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 263.
234. See, e.g., id. (arguing that money dominates the initiative process in California even more than it does the legislative process); BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND
THE GRASS RooTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 90-110 (1987)
(examining 50 ballot questions in four states from 1976 to 1982 and concluding that
campaign spending is the "single most powerful predictor" of the outcome); Daniel H.
Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public
Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 517-47 (1982)
(examining 25 California ballot campaigns between 1968 and 1980 and finding that
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the initial signatures for placing a measure on the ballot235 and
to shape voters' perceptions and ultimate choices in the voting
booth. 236
Many argue that spending by special interest concerns has
dominated direct democracy to the point where it is as vulnerable and responsive to financial influence as the state
legislature. Empirical research is persuasive in this regard.
One California study shows that, until 1988, the money spent.
lobbying state government always exceeded the amount spent
lobbying the public on state initiatives. 237 In 1988, the relative
amounts spent to influence state law shifted, with more spent
to persuade voters in ballot measure contests than to lobby the
state legislature. 238 While scholars concede that it is often
difficult to gauge the degree of influence that campaign spending has on the outcome of a particular election,239 they do seem
one-sided spending in opposition to a measure is highly effective). Total spending on
voter initiatives has increased dramatically over the past decades. For example, in
California in 1976, total spending on the four initiatives on the ballot was approximately $9 million. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 283 tbl. 8.9. By 1988, total
campaign costs for the initiatives that qualified for the ballot were over $127
million-a 1400% increase over 1976. See id. Increased spending may be due in part
to the increase in initiatives to reach the ballot. See id. at 55 tbl. 2.1 (showing that
22 initiatives in the 1970s and 46 initiatives in the 1980s qualified for the California
ballot).
235. There are now professional signature-gathering firms. See DEMOCRACY BY
INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 265. In addition, the California Commission on Campaign
Financing found that any individual, corporation, or organization with approximately
$1 million could place an issue on the ballot and have a chance of enacting a state law.
Id.
236. See id. at 283-84 (noting that campaign groups are increasingly utilizing more
expensive campaign methods than were previously used). In the 1950s, campaign voter
contact strategies were fairly evenly divided among newspaper advertising, broadcast
advertising, and campaign pamphletting. Id. at 284 tbl. 8.10. By 1990, voter outreach
strategies rested almost entirely on expensive broadcast advertising (76% of overall
spending). Id.
237. Id. at 264 tbl. 8.1 (comparing money spent lobbying state government and
money spent lobbying the public on initiatives).
238. Id. The study conducted by the California Fair Political Practices Commission
shows that, from 1976 through 1986, the total amount of money spent to influence
California legislation through the lobbying process was roughly twice that spent to
influence voters through the initiative process, ranging from approximately $10
million (initiatives) compared to $20 million (lobbying) in 1976, to $35 million
(initiatives) compared to $65 million (lobbying) in 1986. Id. In 1988, dollars spent on
initiatives totaled approximately $125 million compared to $85 million for lobbying.
Id.
239. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 234, at 513. Lowenstein writes:
There can be no certain answer to the question of whether big spending "bought"
a victory for or against any particular ballot proposition. To attempt to ascertain
the effects of spending on the election result, one must make judgments

1
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to agree on one proposition: one-sided or substantially greater
spending in opposition to a ballot initiative is highly effective
in gaining defeat of the measure. 240
This proposition certainly proved to be true in the campaigns
surrounding voluntary euthanasia. In California, opponents of
physician-aid-in-dying outspent supporters by more than
double. 241 This spending differential may have contributed to
the successful efforts to lure voters into the "No" camps, but
that conclusion would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove.
While early polls showed that the support for Initiative 119
and Proposition 161 was greater than the opposition to it, 242
there are any number of factors that could have contributed to
the measures' defeat. Intense negative advertising is a likely
suspect, but not the only one. Another explanation may be that
the voters' early response to pollsters reflected their general
approval of euthanasia. 243 Thereafter, voters began to examine
the particulars of a proposal, all the while being lobbied by a
powerful influence, the Catholic Church. 244 Early enthusiasm
turned into a traditional preference for the status quo. 245

regarding what influenced the decisions of millions of individual voters, based
upon fragmentary evidence of the communications that took place during the
campaign and, to the extent such information can be gleaned from public opinion
polls, what voters were thinking.

Id.
240. See id. at 511. In his study, Lowenstein looked at initiative campaigns
between 1968 and 1980 in which spending by either the affirmative or negative side
exceeded $250,000 and was at least twice as high as spending on the opposite side.
Id. Of the 25 initiatives analyzed, the big-spending side won in 16 cases (64%) and
lost in nine (36%). Id. at 518. Breaking down the analysis further into campaigns of
support and opposition, Lowenstein found that, among the 10 measures opposed by
big money, 90% (nine) were defeated, compared to a success rate of 46% for campaigns
in which big money supported.a proposition. Id. at 518-19.
241. Reports of the precise amount of money raised in connection with the two
initiatives varies, but it is clear that opponents raised far more than supporters. See,
e.g., Gilmore, supra note 190, at A14 (reporting that, less than two weeks before the
1992 California election, opponents of Proposition 161 had raised $1. 7 million from
135 groups, more than twice th.at raised by the initiative's sponsors); Miller, supra
note 2 (reporting that opponents of Proposition 161 raised $2.8 million, while backers
raised just $215,000).
242. See supra notes 182, 184.
243. See supra text accompanying Iiote 111 (showing general support for the
concept of physician-aid-in-dying).
244. In both California and Washington, the Catholic Church was a major sponsor
of the campaigns against Proposition 161 and Initiative 119. See Jacobs, supra note
190, at A20; Lori Olszewski, Right-to-Die Law Apparently a Loser, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
4, 1992, at A12.
245. See CRONIN, supra note 6, at 85. ("Support for the 'cautious voter' theory is
provided by findings that about two-thirds of the citizen-initiated measures appearing
on statewide ballots have been rejected.").
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According to this theory, voters are more likely to vote against
a measure that seems radical or extreme, opting for no change
at all. It was not difficult for voters to construe the euthanasia
measures as extreme when opponents argued that they
amounted to murder, often reminding voters of the biblical
commandment, "Thou shall not kill. "246
The demise of the euthanasia initiatives may be attributable
to a host of factors, including resource differentials and voter
preference for the status quo, but their appearance in the
electoral process revealed how political the issue of personal
decision making has become. Initiative 119 and Proposition 161
were not spared campaign efforts to lead and mislead voters
about the ramifications of enacting aid-in-dying legislation.
Special interest influence also played a role in the campaigns.
Thus, the euthanasia ballot initiatives were subjected to the
same political forces that the Progressives sought to evade. 247
In the end, decisions about self-determination and autonomy
were made amid political forces, hardly an ideal setting for
choices of this magnitude.
Turning to the alternative lawmaking body, the legislature,
one hardly sees a political process devoid of special interest
influence and filled with pure, substantive debate. But in the
area of personal decision making about death, any legislation
is better if framed, debated, and enacted in the legislative bodies
of our country rather than by initiative. Recall that every
legislature in our nation, including Congress, has debated the
merits of "right-to-die" issues. 248 Legislators are familiar with
the arguments raised by the primary opponent of such laws,
the Catholic Church. 249 Much of the early "right-to-die" legislation was a product of church influence, which changed its
approach as popular support grew stronger. 250 The mechanisms
of compromise that legislators routinely employ simply are not
available to citizens deciding ballot measures; initiatives are
not subject to public hearings, which can be useful for information gathering, and initiatives can rarely be amended once
signature-gathering commences. 251 Without these opportunities

246. See Jacobs, supra note 184, at 198 (describing the role of religious rhetoric
in the debate over Initiative 119).
247. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 26, 29.
249. See supra note 244.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
251. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 21-23.
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for self-education and compromise, the initiative process
becomes a less desirable mechanism for creating personal choice
regulation.

Ill. DEMOCRACY AS A MEANS OF PROTECTING
BIOETHICAL CHOICES

In Part II of this Article, I criticized the use of direct democracy to enact legislation protective of certain bioethical
choices, namely the right to voluntary euthanasia. My critique
was based in part on the argument that majoritarian voting
has led to a denial of fundamental rights, a problem for which
the remedy lies with an unwilling legislature or with the
efforts of another voter initiative. In either case, those in
search of physician-aid-in-dying are unlikely to see legalization
through the democratic process in the near future. Supporters
might wonder whether democracy in any form is an appropriate vehicle for generating and protecting bioethical choices.
After all, one could argue, if a choice is truly personal, it
should not be the subject of governmental regulation. This
proposition is explored below in the context of both direct and
representative democracy.

A. Direct Democracy and Laws
Affecting Personal Autonomy
At first blush, empowering citizens to draft and enact laws
affecting their private lives seems reasonable in a society that
has historically deemed such legislation appropriate. 252 But
relying on the initiative process to develop a comprehensive
jurisprudence surrounding euthanasia, or any bioethical issue,
is unwise and unfair for at least one major reason: lawmaking
by initiative is only available in twenty-one states in our
nation. 253 Citizens in the remaining twenty-nine states must
look to their state representatives to act in an area they may
not wish to enter.

252. For example, abortion legislation has existed in this country since 1821, when
Connecticut enacted legislation prohibiting the inducement of abortion through the
use of dangerous poisons. See TRIBE, supra note 28, at 28--29.
253. See supra note 164.
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The inequitable availability of direct democracy to citizens
in our country has implications beyond the mere opportunity
to enact voter-made law. That is, even if citizens in the initiative states are unsuccessful in getting ballot propositions
passed, their efforts may serve to alert legislators to the
interest in or need for legislation in particular areas. In fact,
the experience in Washington following the 1991 defeat of
Initiative 119 is a ·good example of a legislature motivated by·
the electorate. In 1992, the Washington Legislature amended
the state's living will law to allow physicians to withhold
nutrition and hydration from terminally ill patients. 254 This
change was included as part of Initiative 119;255 the Legislature
apparently was moved to consider some of the issues raised in
the measure after its defeat. Euthanasia supporters in states
without an initiative mechanism, however, must rely on
traditional lobbying efforts to spur the legislature into action,
a tool that has proved to be unsuccessful to date.
.
The limited availability of the initiative process also could
lead to a divergence in the laws across our country. If euthanasia supporters are eventually able to pass legislation at the
ballot box while legislators generally remain uninspired, we
could see a hodge-podge of laws defining our medicolegal
jurisprudence. This may mean that citizens from non-initiative
states will travel to states recognizing a person's right to
receive aid-in-dying. 256 Forcing terminally ill patients.to travel
any distance is burdensome and ultimately discriminatory
against those who lack the resources to make such a journey.
Checkerboard jurisprudence already does exist in our country in at least one area involving personal decision making:
abortion. 257 In that arena, however, the Supreme Court has

254. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.122.020(5) (1994) (expanding the definition of"lifesustaining treatment," which may be withheld under§ 70.122.030).
255. Colen, supra note 18, at 122.
256. Such was the case for at least the first person who sought the assistance of Dr.
Kevorkian. See Diane M. Gianelli, Murder Charge Filed Against Dr. Kevorkian May
Spur Further Euthanasia Debate, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 14, 1990, at 3. For example,
his first "patient," Janet Adkins, traveled from Oregon, which prohibits assisted suicide,
to Michigan, where the law at that time did not proscribe Dr. Kevorkian's actions. Id.
257. The abortion law in our country is made up of a network of state laws regulating the practice in each state. See generally 1 ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 25 (listing the relevant abortion statutes in each state). Statutes in some states
impose a 24-hour waiting period on women who seek abortion, see, e.g., MISS. CODE
ANN.§ 41-41-33 (1993), while others require parental consent for minors, see, e.g., 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 3206 (1983). Congress has entertained a bill that would create
a federal law protecting the right to choose abortion, but no such law has been
enacted. See S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (entitled the Freedom of Choice Act).
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stepped in to protect a minimal right to reproductive freedom.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 258 the Supreme Court held
that the Constitution protects "the right of the woman to
choose to have an abortion before [fetal] viability and to obtain
it without undue interference from the State." 259 This right,
the Court said, derives from the liberty interest contained in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 260
What this means from a practical standpoint is that states (or
citizen lawmakers) may not enact legislation that would
prohibit or impose a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to
elect early abortion. To date, no protection exists for a right to
choose physician-aid-in-dying, 261 and this could result in a
euthanasia checkerboard that is far more pronounced than
that of abortion. Some states, for example, may permit and
regulate choice-in-dying, while others may prohibit all physician aid. Ultimately this creates inequities among the rights
of terminally ill patients nationally, which is hardly a desired
result in a democratic society.

B. Representative Democracy and Laws
Affecting Personal Autonomy
In our democratic society, we have come to expect that
personal decisions invoking private preferences will be met
with government regulation only under limited circumstances, such as when our actions pose harm to others. The jurisprudence surrounding bioethical choices, such as abortion
and the right to refuse medical treatment, are examples of
governmental deference coupled with limited regulation
aimed at protecting third parties. 262 In the euthanasia arena,

258. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
259. Id. at 2804.
260. Id.
261. See supra note 135 (citing cases in which courts have held that there is no
constitutional right to physician-aid-in-dying).
262. I recognize that public debate surrounding these two issues, particularly
abortion, continues to rage; what I am referring to by "governmental deferencen are
the constitutional protections afforded both practices. In Casey, the Supreme Court
affirmed the pronouncement, first made in Roe u. Wade, that a woman's right to
seek an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is fundamental and permits
no undue governmental interference. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. Likewise, in Cruzan
u. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment, including nutrition and hydration. 497 U.S. 261, 278-80 (1990).
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supporters are now questioning whether choice-in-dying can
be achieved through state regulation and whether a broader,
constitutional approach would best achieve the desired personal autonomy. 263 A brief discussion of the legal theory surrounding regulation of personal choice may shed light on the
particular dilemma facing euthanasia advocates.
In his article, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 264
Professor Sunstein writes that "American law generally treats
private preferences as the appropriate basis for social
choice." 265 Thus, in our society legal interference with private
preferences can be objected to as paternalistic and even tyrannical. 266 According to Professor Sunstein, the bases for
objections to legal interference with private preferences are the
concepts ofliberty and futility. 267 The objection based on liberty
principles argues that the government has no purpose in
evaluating whether a person's choice will serve her interests,
except when that choice causes harm to others. 268 The futility
objection is that interference with private preferences will be
ineffectual, because preferences will surface outside of regulation in a way that counteracts its intended effects. 269 Applying
this theoretical framework on potential regulation of euthanasia, any such regulation could be found objectionable on both
liberty and futility grounds.
The objection to legal interference with private preferences
for physician-assisted suicide based on liberty concerns has
been previously set out. 270 In the words of Judge Rothstein,
"[t]here is no more profoundly personal decision, nor one which
is closer to the heart of personal liberty, than the choice which
a terminally ill person makes to end his or her suffering and
hasten an inevitable death." 271 This liberty interest, broadly

263. E.g., Interview with Michael White, Co-Founder of Californians Against
Human Suffering, Santa Monica, Cal. (Apr. 20, 1994) (speculating that physicianaid-in-dying supporters would turn to the federal courts to gain constitutional
protection rather than continuing to seek legislation, an effort proving futile and
expensive).
264. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129 (1986).
265. Id. at 1129.
266. Id. at 1130.
267. Id. at 1131-32.
268. Id. at 1132.
269. Id.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 200-21.
271. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1461 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
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construed, would include all forms of physician-aid-in-dying,
because to deny any terminally ill patient such a right would
infringe on that person's liberty interest in choosing death:
As to the argument that interference with private preference
will be ineffectual, Professor Sunstein posits that such regulation will be futile because people will act in a way that expresses their private choice, thereby negating the intended
effect of the law. 272 Empirical data surrounding physicians'
practices with respect to their terminally ill patients, though
sparse, indicates that regulation barring doctors from rendering aid-in-dying to those patients would be ineffectual. Even
though voluntary active euthanasia is illegal in every state in
the nation, some physicians have admitted to helping patients
die. For example, according to a survey of physicians conducted
in 1991, "one in ten doctors said they had deliberately taken
action to cause a patient's death." 273 In that same year, a
survey of internists who were members of the American Society
oflnternal Medicine reported that "one in five respondents had
at some point taken 'deliberate action' to end a patient's life."274
The same study found that one in four of the physicians
surveyed revealed that "patients had asked them to assist in
committing suicide."275 These figures reveal that, despite the
current laws prohibiting physicians from actively participating
in a patient's death, such practices do occur, perhaps by as
many as ten to twenty percent of all physicians.
Definitions of what constitutes legal futility may vary, but
if we are cognizant of the apparent desire of both patients and
physicians for more freedom to choose death, then we can
predict that laws denying the full range of choices will likely
be futile. If physicians and patients have already shown their
unwillingness to abide by regulation limiting these freedoms,
any further attempts to circumscribe choice will be met with
either outright defiance or a move toward systematic, covert
practices.
The dilemma for euthanasia advocates who are working
toward legalization is to select a route that will produce the
broadest protections for the most individuals. As noted in Part
III.A, the method of enacting legislation through the initiative

272. Sunstein, supra note 264, at 1132.
273. Richard A. Knox, 1 in 5 Doctors Say They Assisted a Patient's Death, Survey
Finds, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1992, at 5 (referring to a survey conducted by Physicians
Management).
274. Joyce Price, 1 in 5 Doctors Helped Take Life, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, at
A6; see also Knox, supra note 273, at 5 (citing the same survey).
275. Knox, supra note 273, at 5; Price, supra note 274, at A6.
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process is oflimited value as it is available in fewer than half
of our states. 276 Using more traditional lobbying efforts at state
legislatures has proven ineffective to date, but the grass-roots
efforts within selected states may help spur legislative action.
The problem with relying on regulation on a state-by-state
basis is that the law will undoubtedly be uneven, with some
states allowing some highly regulated physician-aid-in-dying,
while others will continue to ban the practice altogether.
Perhaps the best solution lies in combining efforts at the
federal court and state legislative levels. If, for example, the
Supreme Court were to recognize the right to physician-aid-indying as a part of the liberty interest described in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 277 then any state
regulation would have to respect this fundamental right of its
citizens. Thereafter, state regulation would have to meet a
minimum constitutional threshold that would include protection of every citizen's right to exercise choice in dying. Although regulation could still be uneven, as it remains in the
case of abortion, 278 it could not operate to deny individuals the
right to exercise their fundamental right to choose a dignified,
accelerated death.

CONCLUSION

The popularity of the ballot initiative as a way to air politically and socially controversial topics was certainly evident in
November 1992, when voters cast their ballots on measures
relating to euthanasia, abortion, and gay rights.· Direct democracy in the form of ballot initiatives enables citizens to
gain access to lawmaking in the face of a disinterested or
hostile legislature. In the case of physician-aid-in-dying,
direct democracy presented an opportunity for grass roots
supporters to convert a perceived bioethical choice into law.
Yet despite its potential for inspiring widespread citizen
discussion and debate about euthanasia as a bioethical
choice, citizen lawmaking will likely never produce the concentrated, often forced, compromise-oriented debate that can
be achieved in the legislative process. It is this flaw-the l~ck

276. See supra note 164.
277. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
278. See supra note 257.
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of opportunity for citizen bargaining and compromise-that
ultimately indicates that bioethical lawmaking is best placed
in legislative hands. If legal protection of euthanasia is oile
day achieved, 279 it should be through a process that enables
lawmakers to study a variety of choices, pick each of them
apart, and piece together a consensus plan accommodating a
majority interest while still protecting personal autonomy.
This was the history of the right-to-die movement in the
1970s and 1980s; euthanasia proponents can strive for this
same treatment in the years to come.
·
By this conclusion, I do not jntend to suggest that direct
democracy and bioethical choices are completely incompatible;
to the contrary, I believe that the initiative process has and
will play an important role in the fight for physician-aid-indying by triggering public debate about the issue, inevitably
alerting legislators to the need for reasoned debate. 28 Certainly
the experience in Washington following the defeat of Initiative
119 is an excellent example of the role that citizen lawmaking
can play in motivating legislative action. 281 This joint citizen/legislative effort may be a preferred political model for
designing and enacting legislation which so profoundly affects
individual decision making.

°

279. As noted in Part 111.B, I would advocate that euthanasia regulation be
enacted amid constitutional protection recognizing the right to physician-aid-indying as a fundamental liberty interest accorded all citizens.
280. This view is certainly not unique among those who have commented on the
initiative process. For example, in his review of Professor Magleby's '!:look on direct
legislation, Professor Richard Briffault concludes that, despite its shortcomings, direct
·democracy serves an important role in ensuring that certain proposals not ordinarily
high on the legislative agenda are given consideration. Briffault, supra note 11, at
1372 ("So long as enough initiatives succeed periodically to demonstrate the elector. ate's potential lawmaking power, it is probably better that most laws emerge from
the legislative process, with its greater capacity for rationality, compromise, care, and
deliberation."); see also Eule, supra note 8, at 1555 ("Considered judgments, sensitive
to the interests of all, require time, debate, deliberation, information, and shared
power. Substitutive plebiscites shortchange the decision-maker on all these accounts.").
281. See supra text accompanying notes 254-55.

